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NEPA IN THE HOT SEAT: A PROPOSAL FOR AN
OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS
Aliza M. Cohen*
Judicial deference under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) can be
problematic. It is a well-established rule of administrative law that courts will
grant a high degree of deference to agency decisions. They do this out of respect for
agency expertise and policy judgment. This deference is applied to NEPA lawsuits
without acknowledging the special pressures that agencies face while assessing the
environmental impacts of their own projects. Though there is a strong argument
that these pressures undermine the reasons for deferential review, neither the statute
nor the courts have provided plaintiffs with adequate means to remedy this prob-
lem. Agency pressure and environmental harms are often amplified in the context
of climate change and can lead to incongruous results that are scientifically ques-
tionable, counter to NEPA's expressive environmental policy, or both. In light of
the current deficiencies in the interpretation and application of the law and the
pressing issue of global warming, the time is ripe for reforms that will ensure that
agency decisions relect NEPA's expressive purpose and are, at the very least, sup-
ported by honest science. This Note proposes an external office to address NEPA's
shortcomings by providing a higher level of scientific review for agency analyses
under NEPA. The proposed review grants the wide deference for policy judgments
that the administrative state requires, while acknowledging the places where an
agency may not be in the best position to adjudge the veracity of the environmental
impacts of its own projects.
INTRODUCTION
My good friend Melanie and I live on opposite ends of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) spectrum. Unlike me,
Melanie does not concern herself with the statutory or legal details
of our Nation's environmental policy. Rather, as a biological scien-
tist at a large engineering firm, she writes the Environmental
Impact Statements (EIS) that are a key component of NEPA's "ac-
tion-forcing" provisions. Melanie recently told me about one
preliminary assessment she made that revealed environmental
* J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School; M.S. 2005, University of Colo-
rado; B.S. 2004, Cornell University. Articles Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform Volume 44. I would like to thank Matthew Talley for all of his editorial support, as
well as Jesse Kirchner and the members of the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
editorial board for working tirelessly on all elements of this volume. I would also like to
thank Professor Margaret Jane Radin and the participants of the Michigan Law Student
Scholarship Workshop for all of their helpful feedback as I developed this Note, and Profes-
sor Nina Mendelson for always taking my questions about NEPA and administrative law.
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impacts that would be unfavorable to her client's project. Soon af-
ter, the client showed up with lawyers in tow, pressuring Melanie to
modify her findings in response to the client's needs. Melanie re-
fused, but had she done otherwise, her determination, if it
remained scientifically defensible, would be virtually unchallenge-
able as an agency decision through either the administrative
process or judicial review. Not only is this problematic from an ob-
jective scientific viewpoint, but the accepted results would also
seem counter to expressive nature of NEPA,' which aims to inspire
principled actions in accordance with a national environmental
policy. The result, in other words, would be absurd.
Judicial deference under NEPA can be problematic. It is a well-
established rule of administrative law that courts will grant a high
degree of deference to agency decisions.! They do this out of re-
spect for agency expertise and policy judgment. This deference is
applied to NEPA lawsuits without acknowledging the special pres-
sures that agencies face while assessing the environmental impacts
of their own projects. Though there is a strong argument that the-
se pressures undermine the reasons for deferential review, neither
the statute nor the courts have provided plaintiffs with adequate
means to remedy this problem. Agency pressure and environmen-
tal harms are often amplified in the context of climate change and
can lead to incongruous results that are scientifically questionable,
counter to NEPA's expressive environmental policy, or both. In
light of the current deficiencies in the interpretation and applica-
tion of the law and the pressing issue of global warming, the time is
ripe for reforms that will ensure that agency decisions reflect
NEPA's expressive purpose and are, at the very least, supported by
honest science.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of global warming and
the relevant statutes-NEPA and the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). Part II addresses NEPAs role in the climate change debate,
including the characteristics that make it appealing, those that
make it confusing, and those that make it largely ineffective. Part II
also demonstrates that NEPA's expressive characteristics become
more important in light of climate change, requiring a renewed
1. The expressive nature of NEPA is discussed infra Part II.B.2.
2. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) ("We
have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive depart-
ment's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of
deference to administrative interpretations has been consistently followed by this Court
whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling conflict-
ing policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given
situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters sub-
jected to agency regulations." (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961))).
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focus on EIS procedures even though substantive results may re-
main difficult to achieve. Part III proposes an external office to
address NEPA's shortcomings by providing a higher level of scien-
tific review for agency analyses under NEPA. This proposed review
grants the wide deference for policy judgments that the adminis-
trative state requires, while acknowledging the places where an
agency may not be in the best position to adjudge the veracity of
the environmental impacts of its own projects. Part IV concludes.
I. A CLIMATE CHANGE AND STATUTORY PRIMER
A. Climate Change Science
A full account of climate change science can be found else-
where, but this section will highlight some of the salient facts. It is
especially important to note the complexity of both climate change
and its impacts.4 Because the body of climate change science,
though already substantial, is growing, future regulatory strategies
must be stringent enough to halt or reduce harmful impacts, while
being flexible enough to accommodate developing understandings
of what signifies a "cause" and "effect."
A major driver of global climate change, and thus a focus of at-
tempts at both international coordination and domestic legislation,
are anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases into the
3. See generally INTERGOV'T PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYN-
THESIS REPORT (Abdelkader Allah et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter IPCC 2007 SYNTHESIS
REPORT], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf; Endan-
germent and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the
Clean Air Act: Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,516-19 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. ch. 1) [hereinafter Endangerment Finding]; THE NAT'L ACADS., UNDERSTANDING AND
RESPONDING TO CLIMATE CHANGE: HIGHLIGHTS OF NATIONAL ACADEMIES REPORTS (2008),
available at http://dels-old.nas.edu/dels/rptLbriefs/clinate-change-2008_final.pdf.
4. Climate science involves a complex array of natural variability, negative and posi-
tive feedback cycles, and non-linear relationships. See generally INTERGOV'T PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 96-97 (S. Soloman
et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter IPCC 2007 WORKING GROUP 1], available at http://www.ipcc.
ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wgl/ar4-wgl-chapterl.pdf.
5. "Anthropogenic" refers to things that originate in human activity. Though most of
the focus on greenhouse gas regulation is on carbon dioxide (CO,), greenhouse gases also
include methane (CH,), nitrous oxide (NO), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons
(PFCs), sulfur hexafluoride (SF), chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), hydrochlorofluorocarbons
(HCFCs), and the halons (commonly used in fire extinguishers). INTERGOV'T PANEL ON CLI-
MATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS 243 (J.T. Houghton & Y. Ding
eds., 2001) [hereinafter IPCC 2001 WORKING GROUP 1], available at http://www.
grida.no/publications/other/ipcc tar/?src=/climate/ipcctar/wgl/127.htm. According to
the 2007 LPCC report, it is "extremely likely that humans have exerted a substantial warming
influence on climate" since 1750. IPCC 2007 WORKING GROUP 1, supra note 4 at 671 (em-
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atmosphere far in excess of what would occur naturally. These
greenhouse gases affect the global climate by trapping heat within
the atmosphere, resulting in a well-documented planetary warming
effect.6
The identified sources of these emissions are numerous and im-
plicate industrial, commercial, and agricultural interests, as well as
the aggregate activities of private individuals. Other human activi-
ties, such as land use changes, may also contribute to overall climate
change, further complicating the picture.! The impacts of climate
change are felt not only through potential hazards to human
health and property, but also indirectly through effects on a variety
of national and international interests including economic pros-
perity and national security.! Though many impacts are future
phasis added). The measured change in radiative forcing, a value used to quantify the
strength of human and natural agents causing climate change, is at least five times greater
than that which would result from natural forces alone. IPCC 2001 WORKING GROUP 1, supra
note 5, at 131.
6. The correlation between historic atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases
and global temperature is remarkable. SeeJ.R. Petit et al., Climate and Atmospheric History ofthe
Past 420,000 Years from the Vostok Ice Core, Antarctica, 399 NATURE 429, 431 fig.3 (1999); see also
Wibj6rn Karl6n, Global Temperature Forced by Solar Irradiation and Greenhouse Gases?, 30 AmBIO
349 (2001). Modern global temperature measurements, begun in the 1880s, have also
shown marked increases in average temperatures corresponding to the continuing rise of
the concentration of atmospheric greenhouse gases. James Hansen et al., Global Temperature
Change, 103 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 14288, 14289 fig.1 (2006).
7. The primary emissions sources are fossil fuel and biomass combustion for both in-
dustrial and domestic uses. IPCC 2007 SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 3, at 36 fig.2.1. Motor
vehicle emissions are another large contributor, id., with U.S. passenger cars, heavy-, medi-
um-, and light-duty trucks, motorcycles, and buses contributing about 4% of global
greenhouse gas emissions. Endangerment Finding supra note 3, at 66,499. Globally, livestock
production contributes approximately 18% of total anthropogenic greenhouse gas emis-
sions from the major sectors for greenhouse gas reporting. HENNING STEINFELD ET AL.,
FOOD & AGRIc. ORG. OF THE U.N., LIVESTOCK'S LONG SHADOW: ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
AND OPTIONs, 82-83, 112 (2006), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/
a0701e/a0701e00.htm.
8. Changes in vegetation cover and urbanization contribute to climate change by
forcing "changes in the physical properties of the land surface." Roger A. Pielke Sr. et al.,
The Influence of Land-use Change and Landscape Dynamics on the Climate System: Relevance to Cli-
mate-change Policy Beyond the Radiative Effect of Greenhouse Gases, 360 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS
ROYAL Soc'y LONDON A 1705, 1706 (2002); see also IPCC 2007 WORKING GROUP 1, supra
note 4, at 185 ("[T]he overall effect of anthropogenic land cover change on global tempera-
ture will depend largely on the relative importance of increased surface albedo in winter
and spring (exerting a cooling) and reduced evaporation in summer and in the tropics
(exerting a warming).") (citations omitted).
9. See generally IPCC 2007 WORKING GROUP 1, supra note 4, at 409 (rising sea levels);
CTR. FOR HEALTH AND THE GLOBAL ENV'T, CLIMATE CHANGE FUTURES: HEALTH,
ECOLOGICAL, AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS 32 (Sept. 2006) (spread of infectious disease),
available at http://chge.med.harvard.edu/programs/ccf/documents/ccfcreport-oct-
06.pdf; Kerry Emanuel, Increasing Destructiveness of Tropical Cyclones Over the Past 30 Years, 436
NATURE 686 (2005) (intensification of tropical storms and hurricanes); David Stipp, The
Pentagon's Weather Nightmare, FORTUNE, Feb. 9, 2004, at 100 (national security). But see Chris-
topher W. Landsea, Hurricanes and Global Warming 438 NATURE El1 (2005) (questioning
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projections, the actual warming effects have already been recog-
nized. The world is currently entering a streak of unprecedented
warmth, with the decade ending in 2009 being the warmest on
record.'o
These documented and predicted environmental harms with
their attendant effects on human health and welfare are compara-
ble to the dramatic events that spurred the Clean Water Act" and
Clean Air Act,12 further supporting the notion that the "tipping
point" for action to mitigate or address climate change is at hand.13
In tackling climate change, however, unlike the development of
clean water and air laws, scientists and regulators lack an easily
identifiable and politically charged smoking gun: the industrial fa-
cility dumping toxic sludge into a shared waterway, the power plant
belching dangerous particulates over a vulnerable neighboring
community. Greenhouse gas emissions and the other anthropogenic
sources of climate change are often numerous, silent, and odorless;
the nature of greenhouse gases and their global warming effects
make it impossible to discern whose pollution is causing which prol>
lem; and small sources in apparently environmentally invulnerable
places may have large aggregate effects on climate change. At the
moment, comprehensive and effective climate change legislation
may be too much of a political hot potato, so it is imperative that
methods used in Emanuel's study); Roger A. Pielke, Jr., Are There Trends in Hurricane Destruc-
tion?, 438 NATURE Eli (2005) (noting no corresponding increase in hurricane damages).
10. John Broder, Past Decade Warmest on Record, NASA Data Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22,
2010, at A8; see also Endangerment Finding, supra note 3, at 66,517-18; GISS Surface Temperature
Analysis, NASA (Jan. 13, 2009), http://data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/2008 ("Calendar year 2008
was the coolest year since 2000 .... 2008 [was] the ninth warmest year in the period of instru-
mental measurements, which extends back to 1880 ... . The ten warmest years all occur within
the 12-year period 1997-2008."); 2009: Second Wannest Year on Reconi; End of Warmest Decade,
NASA (January 21, 2010), http://www.giss.nasa.gov/research/news/20100121/.
11. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006). See, e.g., David Stradling & Richard Stradling, Per-
ceptions of the Burning River. Deindustrialization and Cleveland's Cuyahoga River, 13 ENVTL. HIST.
515 (2008).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006). See, e.g., Ann Murray, Smog Deaths in 1948 Led to
Clean Air Laws, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (April 22, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyld=103359330.
13. "Tipping point" has two meanings in this context. First, the notion of a legislative
tipping point reflects changes in how the general populace and industries perceive the need
for climate change regulation. See, e.g., John Carey & Adam Aston, Climate Wars: Episode Two,
Bus. WK., Apr. 23, 2007, at 90 ("[T]he science debate is ancient history. The current argu-
ment. . . is about how the government should act to curb carbon emissions. 'We've reached
a tipping point on this issue,' says Jeff Sterba, CEO of Southwestern utility PNM Re-
sources."). Second, the "tipping point" often refers to the scientific notion of a point beyond
which climate change is irreversible. See, e.g., Marten Scheffer et al., Early-Warning Signals for
Critical Transitions, 461 NATURE 53 (2009); Juliet Eilperin, Debate on Climate Change Shifts to
Issues of Irreparable Change, WASH. PosT, Jan. 29, 2006, at Al; Brian Walsh, Is There a Climate-
Change Tipping Point?, TIME (Sept. 4, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/health/article/
0,8599,1920168,00.html.
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courts and federal agencies be given a politically viable option to
address these issues. It is auspicious then, that NEPA, if properly
supported by certain reforms, provides a sufficiently broad and
flexible mandate to tackle the unique challenges inherent in cli-
mate change.
B. Statutory Framework
In a world where environmental statutes often encompass hun-
dreds of pages, NEPA and the APA are notable both for their
brevity and the broad impacts they have on federal agency deci-
sion-making. As a starting point for later discussion, both NEPA
and the APA, which govern the means by which agency actions be-
come subject to NEPA as well asjudicial review of those actions, are
presented in this section.
1. NEPA
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ushered in a
decade of environmental lawmaking. 14 The passage of the Act was
spurred by a growing sentiment that "the most dangerous of all ...
enemies is man's own undirected technology"" and that a solution
to the problem would necessarily touch on "practically every aspect
of everyday life: economic, scientific, technological, legal, and even
interpersonal." 6 Accordingly, NEPA's drafters intended to harmo-
nize environmental protection with the resource consumption
necessary to advance the "health and welfare of man."
14. Upon signing the bill into law, President Nixon issued a statement proclaiming
that "the nineteen-seventies absolutely must be the years when America pays its debt to the
past by reclaiming the purity of its air, its waters and our living environment. It is literally
now or never." Text of Nixon Statement, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 2, 1970, at 12. After NEPA, Congress
passed the vastly revised Federal Water Pollution Control Act in 1970 (amended as the
Clean Water Act in 1972), the Coastal Zone Management Act in 1972, the Endangered Spe-
cies Act in 1973, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act in 1976, and the amended
Clean Air Act in 1977. These statutes form the bulk of the nation's major environmental
laws. See also Nicholas C. Yost, NEPA's Promise-Partially Fulfilled, 20 ENvrL. L. 533, 534 & n.5
(1990) ("Senator Jackson [NEPA's Senate author] characterized NEPA as 'the most im-
portant and far-reaching environmental and conservation measure ever enacted,'" andJohn
Dingell, its House author proclaimed that "we must consider the natural environment as a
whole and assess its quality continuously if we really wish to make strides in improving and
preserving it.") (citations omitted).
15. H.R. REP. No. 91-378, at 117 (1969) (quoting a May 3, 1969 New York Timet editorial).
16. Id.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006).
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NEPA advances this purpose by declaring a broad national policy
to elevate environmental concerns, and by providing "action-
forcing" measures, in the form of Environmental Impact Statements,
to assure its implementation.'8 NEPA also established the President's
Council on Environmental Quality to oversee the implementation of
NEPA and further the policies set forth in the enabling statute.'9
These three elements-policy, procedure, and executive agency
oversight-were intended to work together, much like a system of
checks and balances, to ensure the success of the policy as a whole."
NEPA's declaration of environmental policy sets forth a broad
mandate for the federal government to "use all practicable means
and measures ... in a manner calculated to foster and promote the
general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which
man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the
social, economic, and other requirements of present and future
generations of Americans."21
This policy applies to the diverse activities of the federal govern-
ment, including the routine coordination of all "plans, functions,
programs, and resources",2 and administration of all "policies, regu-
lations, and public laws of the United States."2 Though the formal
statement is broad and lofty, NEPA's declaration of national policy
specifies six ends which the federal government has "continuing
responsibility" to carry out.24 These include efforts to secure for
both current and future generations their needs for pleasant sur-
roundings, environmental health and safety, historic, natural, and
cultural resources, as well as maintenance of a high quality of life
and equitable apportionment of limited natural resources.2 ' This
policy represents an assertion that environmental protection
should be part of the broad mandate of every federal agency.26
18. S. REP. No. 91-296, at 9 (1969); 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (requiring agencies to prepare
written statements outlining the impacts and setting forth alternatives for any major federal
action having a significant effect on the "quality of the human environment").
19. 42 U.S.C. § 4342.
20. S. REP. No. 91-296, at 24-25 (stating that it is the purpose of the Board of Envi-
ronmental Quality Advisors-later, the Council on Environmental Quality-to evaluate
broadly the successes of federal programs in "relation to environmental trends and prob-
lems" and make recommendations to the President).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (a).
22. Id. § 4331(b).
23. Id. § 4332(1).
24. Id. § 4331(b).
25. Id. § 4331 (b) (1)-(6).
26. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Mathews, 410 F. Supp. 336, 337 (D.D.C. 1976)
(finding that NEPA "provides FDA with supplementary authority to base its substantive deci-
sions on all environmental considerations including those not expressly identified in ...
other statutes" and holding that FDA may not prohibit the Commissioner from acting solely
on the basis of environmental considerations); First Nat'l Bank v. Watson, 363 F. Supp. 466,
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It is significant that NEPA does not impose any substantive re-
quirements on the federal government. Rather than mandating a
particular balance for or against the environment, it emphasizes
that agencies should consider environmental impacts in a way
"consistent with other essential considerations of national policy.""
With ample use of balancing language," NEPA's text makes clear
that environmental considerations are just one of many elements
agencies are expected to consider. Because the statute does not
specify the gravity an agency must give to environmental considera-
tions, 9 NEPA "leaves room for a responsible exercise of discretion
and may not require particular substantive results in particular
problematic instances.",o
Though substantively flexible, NEPA imposes rigid procedural
obligations on federal agencies. The key component of its proce-
dural mandate is the preparation of an EIS: a detailed statement
outlining an action's environmental impacts, both avoidable and
unavoidable, and any possible alternatives.
472 (D.D.C. 1973) ("NEPA applies to all federal agencies, including the Comptroller of the
Currency.").
27. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b).
28. This includes a focus on attaining "the widest range of beneficial uses," id.
§ 4331(b) (3) (emphasis added); maintaining "wherever possible, an environment which sup-
ports diversity and variety of individual choice," id. § 4331(b) (4) (emphasis added);
achieving a "balance between population and resource use," id. § 4331(b) (5) (emphasis add-
ed); and approaching rather than achieving "maximum attainable recycling of depletable
resources," id. § 4331(b) (6).
29. See, e.g., Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 100
(1983) ("NEPA does not require agencies to adopt any particular internal decisionmaking
structure.").
30. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d
1109,1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Despite NEPA's emphasis on environmental stewardship, courts
have not interpreted the statute's balancing language to require that agencies "elevate envi-
ronmental concerns over other appropriate considerations." Strycker's Bay Neighborhood
Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980). Cf Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 1531(c) (2010) ("It is further declared to be the policy of Congress that all Federal de-
partments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species and threatened species
and shall utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter."). Courts
interpret this stronger language as requiring agencies to "halt and reverse the trend toward
species extinction, whatever the cost." Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978);
see also id. at 179-83 (explaining the careful omission of balancing language from the En-
dangered Species Act policy statement). The absurd results that may flow from the lack of
substantive mandate are discussed infra Part II.C.
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i)-(iii); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.11 (2009) (defining Environ-
mental Impact Statement as a "detailed written statement as required by § 102(2)(C) of
[NEPA]"). See also Jason J. Czarnezki, Comment, Defining the Project Purpose under NEPA, 70
U. Cm. L. REv. 599, 602-04 (2003) (discussing how courts have interpreted NEPA's "rea-
sonable alternatives" requirement).
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The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)32 promulgates
regulations that guide agencies through the EIS process.3' The
CEQ's regulations seek to ensure that an agency's environmental
analysis is thorough, with the assumption that thorough analyses
will result in well-reasoned actions. Though the aspirations of
NEPA's national environmental policy apply to the interpretation
and administration of all "polices, regulations, and public laws of
the United States,""3 an EIS is only required for "major Federal ac-
tions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment."3 In some circumstances, an agency may avoid the
costly and time-intensive EIS process by preparing a less rigorous
environmental analysis called an Environmental Assessment (EA)"
along with a "Finding of No Significant Impact" (FONSI)." The
agency may also promulgate a list of Categorical Exclusions (CE);39
32. The CEQ is an Executive Office charged with advising, assisting, and reporting to
the President on matters concerning environmental policies and environmental quality. 42
U.S.C. § 4344. See also HENRY M. JACKSON FOUND., FACING THE FUTURE: RECOMMENDATIONS
ON THE WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, at Attachment B (2008),
available at http://www.eli.org/pdf/seminars/NEPA/Facing%20the%20Future.pdf. To that
extent, CEQ publishes regulations to ensure that NEPA doesn't just generate "excellent
paperwork," but that it fosters "excellent action." 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c).
33. The regulations promulgated by CEQ are binding on federal agencies. 40 C.F.R.
§ 1500.3 ("Parts 1500 through 1508 of this title provide regulations applicable to and bind-
ing on all Federal agencies for implementing the procedural provisions. . . ."). But see Tomac
v. Norton, 433 F.3d 852, 861 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that the "binding effect of CEQ regu-
lations is far from clear").
34. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 ("The primary purpose of an environmental impact state-
ment is to serve as an action-forcing device to insure that the policies and goals defined in
the Act are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal Government.").
See also id. § 1502.2 (requiring an agency's EIS to "state how alternatives considered in [the
EIS] and decisions based on it will or will not achieve the requirements of sections 101 and
102(1) of the Act and other environmental laws and policies").
35. 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
36. Id. § 4332(C). The regulations provide guidance on the definitions of "major,"
"federal," and "action" within the meaning of the statute. "Major reinforces but does not
have a meaning independent of significantly," 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18, which is further defined
in terms of both "context and intensity" of the activity's impacts. Id. § 1508.27. "Federal"
actions include "agency rules, regulations, plans, policies, or procedures, . . . legislative pro-
posals," and new or continuing activities which are either "entirely or partly financed,
assisted, conducted, regulated, or approved by federal agencies." Id. § 1508.18(a). "Actions"
include the aforementioned policies (including formal rules, regulations, and interpreta-
tions) and plans, the implementation of programs, as well as the "approval of specific
projects ... located in a defined geographic area." Id. § 1508.18(b) (1)-(4). See, e.g., Friends
of the Earth, Inc. v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889,912, 915-16 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (explain-
ing that the point at which federal support of a state or local project turns the project into a
.major federal action" is a question of degree).
37. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9.
38. Id. § 1508.13.
39. Id. § 1508.4.
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once the exclusion has been established, an action falling under it
will not require an EIS."
If a proposed activity requires an EIS, the agency must consider
all of its possible direct,4' indirect," and cumulative effects. Addi-
tionally, the CEQ requires agencies to supplement an EIS as
"significant new circumstances or information relevant to envi-
ronmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its
impacts" arise.44 The "heart of the environmental impact state-
ment"4 is not in the discussion of the proposed action or its
impacts, but in its analysis of "all reasonable alternatives." 6 An
agency must consider the "no action" alternative 4 ' as well as any
"reasonable alternatives not within the jurisdiction of the lead
agency."48 Though it has not come out this way in practice,49 these
regulations imply that an agency, upon consideration of the na-
tional environmental policy, might entirely forego a proposed
project, or at least its control over it. In other words, the regula-
tions seek to ensure that section 101 of NEPA, not the proposed
agency action, is the "controlling policy.""0
Because of the extensive list of covered activities and broad
timescale by which the effects of agency actions must be analyzed,
all manner of federal actions and impacts may become eligible for
review under NEPA. This makes the statute an attractive tool for
parties seeking to challenge federal actions that spark environmen-
tal concerns, including those related to climate change, which
40. Id.
41. Id. § 1508.8(a) ("[C]aused by the action and occur[ing] at the same time and
place.").
42. Id. § 1508.8(b) ("[Claused by the action and ... later in time or farther removed
in distance.").
43. Id. § 1508.7 ("[T]he impact on the environment which results from the incremen-
tal impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable
future actions regardless of what agency . . .or person undertakes such other actions.").
44. Id. § 1502.9(c).
45. Id. § 1502.14.
46. Id. § 1502.14(a) (emphasis added).
47. Id. § 1502.14(d).
48. Id. § 1502.14(c).
49. See infra Part II.C.
50. William C. Martucci, Comment, The Developing Common Law of 'Major Federal Action'
Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 31 ARK. L. REv. 254, 255 (1977). See also
Czarnezki, supra note 31, at 607-08 (2003) (examining narrow construction of agency pur-
pose). Unfortunately, the NEPA process itself requires the expenditure of great amounts of
time and money. See Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. BLM, 586 F.3d 735, 754 (9th Cir.
2009) (dissenting opinion) (explaining the arduous and costly EIS/EIR process for a mine
project near Joshua Tree National Park); Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp.
Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 533 (8th Cir. 2003) ("In all, the environmental review process took nearly
four years and generated roughly 8,600 public comments.").
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might not be specifically covered under any other environmental
statue.
2. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946
NEPA applies to all major Federal actions, and the majority of
these actions-rules, regulations, interpretations, programs, and
the like '-are actually the work of administrative agencies. Con-
gress establishes the broad contours of legislation, sets forth the
statutory objective, and often delegates policy choices and adminis-
trative details to the proper agency. The agency ostensibly has the
resources and expertise required to formulate and implement the
applicable rules. Delegation is common in environmental stat-
utes, where implementation may require an understanding of
complex scientific concepts, as well as familiarity with state-of-the-
art pollution control technologies.54
51. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text
52. Administrative agencies include cabinet agencies, independent executive agencies,
and independent regulatory commissions. See Federal Executive Branch, USA.Gov,
http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/Federal/Executive.shtml (last updated Oct. 28, 2010) (listing
the cabinet agencies); Independent Agencies and Government Corporations, USA.GOV,
http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/Federal/Independent.shtml (last updated Oct. 28, 2010)
(listing independent executive agencies); Boards, Commissions and Committees, USA.Gov,
http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/Federal/Boards.shtml (last updated Oct. 28, 2010) (listing
independent regulatory commissions). Though not expressly provided for in the Constitu-
tion, which vests legislative authority in Congress and Congress alone, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1,
these agencies, often referred to as the "fourth branch," are crucial to the proper function-
ing of the legislative scheme. See generally Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 583 (1984) (listing four
significant features of the modem administrative government).
53. Congress provides enabling language in the statute. See generally Elizabeth V. Foote,
Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron Misconceives the Functions of Agen-
cies and Why it Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REv. 673, 679 (2007); see also Strauss, supra note 52, at
584 (citing the Mine Safety Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and other exam-
ples from the administrative state).
54. See, e.g., section 302(a) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7 602(a) (2006) (defining
"Administrator" as "the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency" and refer-
ring to "Administrator" more than 2,000 times throughout the statute); section 3(15) of the
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (2006) (defining "Secretary" as either the
Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Commerce, or the Secretary of Agriculture and
referring to "Secretary" nearly 300 times throughout the statute); section 101(d) of the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (2006) (providing that "the Administrator of the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (hereinafter in this Act called 'Administrator') shall
administer this Act" and mentioning "Administrator" nearly 950 times throughout the stat-
ute). Though common, legislative delegation is a topic of criticism and concern among both
lawyers and academics. Courts continually grapple with the distinction between delegable
and non-delegable legislative authority. See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517
(1910) ("The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important subjects,
which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which
a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such
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The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) formalizes the
process by which the agencies to which Congress delegates authori-
ty promulgate their rules and regulations." Because NEPA lawsuits
involve challenges to agency actions in federal courts, this section
will focus on the judicial review provisions found in section 10 of
the APA.16 The APA authorizes judicial review of any "final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court."5 1
NEPA does not include its own provision for judicial review, and
thus falls under the APA standard. The following agency actions
under NEPA are considered "final agency action[s]" under the
APA:5' an agency's promulgation of a Final Environmental Impact
Statement (FEIS) ;6o an agency's action or inaction with regard to a
general provisions to fill up the details." (internal quotations omitted)). Though courts
argue that agencies are merely filling in the blanks left by Congress, id., no one can doubt
that the rules and regulations promulgated by these agencies carry with them the force of
law, raising constitutional separation of power concerns. See generally Sandra B. Zellmer, The
Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st Century Administrative State: Beyond the New Dea 32
ARIZ. ST. LJ. 941, 948-57 (2000); Frederick R. Anderson, Revisiting the Constitutional Status of
the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 277, 278 (1986-1987); Symposium, The Uneasy
Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 296 (1986-1987); Cass
Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT. REv. 177, 198 (1983) (The
APA "was largely a product of dissatisfaction with the legitimacy of the administrative agency
in American government").
55. See U.S. DEPT OFJJUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT, 9 (1947) (Outlining the "four basic purposes" of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act: (1) To require agencies to keep the public currently informed of their
organization, procedures and rules; (2) To provide for public participation in the rule mak-
ing process; (3) To prescribe uniform standards for the conduct of formal rulemaking and
adjudicatory proceedings; (4) To restate the law ofjudicial review).
56. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2006). This Note does not address the rulemaking proce-
dures embodied in the APA, but understanding these provisions may be useful in
understanding the scope of agency actions that may be subject to NEPA review. See generally
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, supra note 55, at
§§ I.C & III (explaining distinction between rulemaking and adjudication and discussing
§ 4(b) of the APA, respectively); RichardJ. Pierce, Rulemaking and the Administrative Procedure
Act, 32 TULSA L.J. 185, 186-87 (1996).
57. 5 U.S.C. § 704; see also id. § 701(a) ("This chapter applies, according to the provi-
sions thereof, except to the extent that (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency
action is committed to agency discretion by law.").
58. Other environmental statutes, in comparison, do contain a provision for judicial
review. For judicial review provisions in major environmental statutes, see 42 U.S.C. § 6976
(Resource Conservation and Recovery Act) (referencing APA); 15 U.S.C. § 2618 (Toxic
Substance Control Act) (referencing APA), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (Clean Water Act), and 42
U.S.C. § 7607(b) (Clean Air Act).
59. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) ("As a general matter, two condi-
tions must be satisfied for agency action to be final: First, the action must mark the
consummation of the agency's decision-making process-it must not be of a merely tentative
or interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be one by which rights or obligations
have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.") (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
60. See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989) (chal-
lenging the sufficiency of an EIS); see also Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360
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Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS);"' an agen-
cy's completion of an EA/FONSI;6 2 and an agency's application of
a CE.6 ' Taken together, these claims represent a majority of the
more than one hundred NEPA cases-all decided under the APA's
standard for judicial review-filed each year.'
The APA sets forth a highly deferential "arbitrary and capri-
65cious" default standard for courts reviewing agency decisions.
Under this standard, the reviewing court shall set aside an agency
decision only if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law."66 As the Supreme Court has
(1989) (challenging the Army Corps of Engineers' determination that a supplemental EIS
was unnecessary). But see 5 U.S.C. § 704 ("A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency
action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency
action.").
61. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 73 (2004) (conservation group
challenging Bureau of Land Management's failure to prepare a SEIS); Miss. River Basin
Alliance v. Westphal, 230 F.3d 170 (5th Cir. 2000) (conservation groups challenging ade-
quacy of an SEIS where the "Court's role in reviewing the adequacy of the SEIS is governed
by the Administrative Procedure Act"); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c) (2009) (outlining when
agencies shall prepare supplements to either a draft or final EIS).
62. See, e.g., Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008) (plaintiffs chal-
lenging Navy's EA for naval readiness activities in Southern California, which resulted in a
finding of no significant impact); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.9, .13 (defining EA and FONSI,
respectively).
63. See, e.g., West v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Transp., 206 F.3d 920, 926-29 (9th Cir. 2000);
see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (defining CE).
64. For more detailed information, see the collection of NEPA litigation surveys avail-
able for the years 2001-2008 on the CEQ website. National Environmental Policy Act-
Litigation, COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/legal-corner/
litigation.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
65. Ray v. Lehman, 55 F.3d 606, 608 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("The scope of review under the
arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for
that of the agency."); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 283 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
("This 'arbitrary and capricious' standard of review is a highly deferential one which pre-
sumes the agency's action to be valid.") (citations omitted); Nat'l Motor Freight Traffic
Ass'n v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 590 F.2d 1180, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("In general, the
'arbitrary and capricious' standard requires a reviewing court to defer to an agency's judg-
ment so long as it has a rational basis."). But see Scott A. Keller, Depoliticizingjudicial Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 84 WASH. L. REv. 419 (2009) (proposing that courts review agency rule-
making under the "rational basis with bite" standard).
66. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). The full text of the provision reads:
The reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to
be-(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law; (E) unsupported by substantial
evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed
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interpreted it, a court generally should overturn an agency action
under the APA only if
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not in-
tended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important
aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision
that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in
view or the product of agency expertise.
The APA thus puts the onus on the courts to accurately discern
what Congress intended and to ensure that the agency decision is
not "implausible" given the context.
The narrow scope of APA review makes the courts' interpreta-
tion of the statute's intent crucial. Since NEPA lacks rigid
substantive mandates, courts have failed to link NEPA's procedural
provisions with the "substantive" declaration of environmental pol-
icy. The courts' construction of "arbitrary and capricious" in the
context of NEPA and its implications for NEPA's effectiveness as a
tool for environmental protection (and global climate change mit-
igation) will be considered in the following section.
II. THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY:
NEPA AND CLIMATE CHANGE
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA
and the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Endangerment
Finding for greenhouse gas emissions under section 202 of the
Clean Air Act,69 the EPA is authorized to move forward with climate
change regulations.o Because many believe that the Clean Air Act
on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or (F) unwarranted by the
facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.
67. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983). Courts also read the APA to require agencies to supply a "reasoned basis" for the
challenged action. Id.
68. 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007) (holding that section 202(a) (1) of the Clean Air Act "au-
thorizes EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles in the event
that it forms a 'judgment' that such emissions contribute to climate change").
69. 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2006) (governing emissions standards for new motor vehicles);
see also Endangerment Finding, supra note 3, at 66,497 (in which the Administrator declared
that greenhouse gases "may reasonably be anticipated both to endanger public health and
to endanger public welfare"); Ian Talley, EPA Declares Greenhouse Gases a Danger, WALL ST.J.,
Dec. 8, 2009, at B4.
70. See Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260, 56,264-65
(Oct. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.86) (discussing EPA's legal authority to move
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is not the ideal statutory tool to regulate greenhouse gas emis-
sions," Congress is concurrently drafting its own climate change
legislation." In the meantime, plaintiffs rely on both common law
claims" and existing environmental regulations" to address cli-
mate change where federal regulations offer no effective remedy.
Regardless of the authority under which future climate change
regulations will be promulgated, such rules are now inevitable.
The question has morphed from "should we regulate greenhouse
gas emissions" to "how best should we regulate greenhouse gas
forward with its Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Report Rule); Prevention of Significant Deteri-
oration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,558 (June 3,
2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51) (explaining how Congress intended for the Clean
Air Act's Prevention of Signification Deterioration provisions to apply to greenhouse gases);
Proposed Rulemaking To Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards
and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 Fed. Reg. 49,454 (proposed Sept. 28,
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 86).
71. See, e.g., Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed.
Reg. 44,354, 44,355 (July 30, 2008) ("The potential regulation of greenhouse gases under
any portion of the Clean Air Act could result in an unprecedented expansion of EPA au-
thority that would have a profound effect on virtually every sector of the economy and touch
every household in the land.... [P]ursuing this course of action would inevitably result in a
very complicated, time-consuming and, likely, convoluted set of regulations."); Holly Dore-
mus & W. Michael Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater. Why the Clean Air Act's Cooperative
Federalism Framework is Useful for Addressing Global Warming, 50 ARiz. L. REv. 799, 821 (2008)
("[U]nique and basic aspects of the presence of key GHGs in the atmosphere make the
[National Ambient Air Quality Standards] system fundamentally ill-suited to addressing
global climate change.") (citations omitted); see generally Arnold W. Reitze,Jr., Federal Control
of Carbon Dioxide Emissions: What are the Options?, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 2-15 (2009).
72. See, e.g., American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
(2009). Progress is slow, however. See John M. Broder, Climate Bill is Threatened by Senators,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2009, at A12; John Kerry & Lindsey Graham, Yes We Can (Pass Climate
Change Legislation), N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2009, at WK1I ("Conventional wisdom suggests that
the prospect of Congress passing a comprehensive climate change bill soon is rapidly ap-
proaching zero."); Andrew C. Revkin, Obama Aide Concedes Climate Law Must Wait, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2009, at All.
73. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009); Comer v. Murphy
Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009); see generally John Schwartz, Courts as Battlefield in Cli-
mate Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2010, at Al. But see Native Vill. of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (no standing found on political question
grounds).
74. These include the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act. See generally
Ari N. Sommer, Taking the Pit Bull off the Leash: Siccing the Endangered Species Act on Climate
Change, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 273 (2009); see also Ocean Acidification and Marine pH
Water Quality Criteria, 74 Fed. Reg. 17,485 (Apr. 15, 2009); Letter from Miyoko Sakashita,
Ocean Program Attorney & Ann Moritz, Ocean and Climate Program Law Clerk, Ctr. for
Bio. Diversity, to Susan Braley, Unit Supervisor, Water Quality Program, Wash. Dep't of Ecolo-
gy (Aug. 15, 2007), http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/ocean-acidification/pdfs/
WA_303d letter_08-15-07.pdf (asserting that if states are required to list ocean waters as
impaired, they could theoretically be required to set Total Maximum Daily Loads for atmos-
pheric carbon dioxide emissions to meet their obligations under the CWA). Cases involving
NEPA and climate change are discussed infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
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emissions?" 75 This section will demonstrate that, regardless of the
structure of future climate change legislation, NEPA has potential
to remain an important statute for addressing climate change. In
doing so, this section also addresses some of the more vexing issues
surrounding NEPA's application to climate change.
In more than a dozen lawsuits since 2003, plaintiffs have used
NEPA to challenge an agency's failure to adequately consider the
climate change impacts of major federal projects." A growing
number of courts are willing to conclude that global-warming im-
pacts and carbon emissions fall within NEPA's purview, both
categorically," and as a foreseeable effect of the agency's action.
This section analyzes the extent to which NEPA can rationally func-
tion as an effective part of the nation's climate change regime. Part
A focuses on NEPA's benefits, namely the areas in which it fills ex-
isting gaps in a command-and-control regulatory framework. Part
B focuses on threshold questions that stymie discourse on NEPA
and climate change. Part C then shows how climate change exac-
erbates widely recognized shortfalls in NEPA jurisprudence.
75. See generallyJ.R. DeShazo &Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The
Case for Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1499, 1533-38 (2007) (indicating a shift in prefer-
ence among industry for federal climate change regulation).
76. Jessica Leber, Can AEPA Pass Tests Posed by Climate-Related Projects, E&E NEWS
(Mar. 26, 2009), http://www.eenews.net/public/climatewire/2009/03/26/1.
77. See Ctr. for Bio. Diversity v. Nat'1 Highway Traffic Safety Admin. 538 F.3d 1172,
1217 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that "[t]he impact of greenhouse gas emissions on climate
change is precisely the kind of cumulative impacts analysis that NEPA requires agencies to
conduct"); Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 548, 550 (8th
Cir. 2003) (finding that the Surface Transportation Board had failed to account for pollu-
tants, including carbon dioxide, that do not fall under a regulatory cap). But see Audubon
Naturalist Soc'y v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 524 F. Supp. 2d. 642, 708 (D. Md. 2007) (finding
the lack of national cap for greenhouse gas emissions a determinative factor in holding that
it was not useful to consider greenhouse gas emissions as part of the planning and develop-
ment process).
78. See Mid States Coal. for Progress, 345 F.3d at 550 (" [1It would be irresponsible for the
[Surface Transportation Board] to approve a project of this scope without first examining
the effects that may occur as a result of the reasonably foreseeable increase in coal consump-
tion."); Friends of the Earth v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (holding
that plaintiffs could demand review of domestic effects of increased greenhouse gas emis-
sions from federal support of international fossil fuel exploration projects); Border Power
Plant Working Grp. v. Dep't of Energy, 260 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1017 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (requir-
ing consideration of climate change impacts for generation of power by one turbine of
Mexican power plant, where Presidential Permits and federal rights-of-way connecting the
plant to the power grid in Southern California were the but-for cause of generation of power
at the turbine). Caleb W. Christopher also identifies a third barrier to incorporating climate
change impact considerations in Environmental Impact Statements: the determination of
whether the project's impact is "significant." Caleb W. Christopher, Success by a Thousand
Cuts: The Use ofEnvironmental Impact Assessment in Addressing Climate Change, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L.
549, 556 (2008).
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Together, these three sections set the stage for the proposed re-
form that follows.
A. The Good: NEPA's Structural Advantages in
the Climate Change Context
1. Ex Ante, Not Ex Post
The purpose of NEPA is to "incorporate environmental consid-
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erations into federal agencies decision-making processes ....
Thus, NEPA takes an ex ante rather than ex post approach to envi-
ronmental harms. By requiring agencies to fully disclose
foreseeable harms and consider alternative actions before expend-
ing great amounts of money, NEPA forces consideration of
environmental considerations before a project becomes "the con-
trolling policy."80
A NEPA suit typically seeks an injunction to halt a project pend-
ing a more adequate environmental review.8 ' By contrast, plaintiffs
in common law nuisance actions often seek equitable remedies to
restrict extant sources of pollution. In Connecticut v. American Elec-
tric Power Company," for example, plaintiffs sought abatement of
"[d]efendants' ongoing contributions to the public nuisance of
global warming." 3 The defendants, significant greenhouse gas
emitters, included six electric power companies running fossil-fuel
fired power plants in twenty states. Putting aside the question of
whether a court would ever issue an injunction in this case,85 the
requested remedy, for all of its environmental gains, would also
result in the loss of jobs and foregone investment in substantial
infrastructure. On the other hand, if the court awarded damages in
lieu of an injunction, such damages could be difficult to quantify
and the results would be inequitable: only the participating plain-
tiffs would receive compensation for global harms. Consequently, it
is more efficient and equitable to preempt a harmful project
79. Wilderness Soc'y v. Salazar, 603 F. Supp. 2d 52, 59 (D.D.C. 2009).
80. See supra note 50.
81. See Thomas 0. McGarity,JudicialEnforcement of NEPA-Inspired Promises, 20 ENVTL. L.
569, 573 (1990).
82. 582 F.3d 309, 314 (2d Cir. 2009).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. For an example of the Supreme Court denying such an injunction, see Missouri v.
Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 525-26 (1906) (citing, in part, the doctrine of unclean hands). See also
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1970) (considering a dispari-
ty in economic consequences when deciding whether to issue a permanent injunction
against a cement plant).
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before construction is underway. A NEPA lawsuit targeting a power
project at the federal permitting or funding stage8 6 can avoid these
sunk-cost considerations for litigants.
2. Capturing Sources Otherwise Under the Regulatory Radar
Because carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases are emitted
by every exhaling mammal, every wood-burning fireplace, every
backyard barbecue, and onward up the chain to every coal-fired
power plant, legislation seeking to curb greenhouse gas emissions
must set a threshold below which regulation does not reach in or-
der to avoid counterproductive results."' The Clean Water Act
demonstrates the unanticipated drawbacks of attempting to regu-
late multiple widespread sources. Although the Clean Water Act
declares it a national goal to halt all discharges of pollution into
navigable waters, it strictly limits the category of regulated dis-
charges to point sources (largely municipal and industrial
discharges)88 and takes a limited approach to nonpoint source pol-
lution from unregulated land-use activities.88 The results are
striking: despite the successful implementation of the point source
permitting program, water quality remains a serious issue, largely a
result of nonpoint source pollution. 0 Extensive scholarship has
86. This amount of federal involvement can allow even a private project to qualify as a
"major federal action" subject to NEPA review. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006).
87. See, e.g., Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. at 56,266-67
(Oct. 30, 2009) (limiting application of the rule to specific source categories with green-
house gas emissions above a threshold amount).
88. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 (a) (1) & 1362(12) (2006). Point sources are defined as any "dis-
cernible, confined and discrete conveyance" with a specific exemption for agricultural
runoff. Id. § 1362(14); see also United States v. Plaza Health Labs., 3 F.3d 643, 647 (2d Cir.
1993) ("We find no suggestion ... that [Clongress intended the CWA to impose criminal
liability on an individual for the myriad, random acts of human waste disposal, for example,
a passerby who flings a candy wrapper into the Hudson River, or a urinating swimmer. Dis-
cussions during the passage of the 1972 amendments indicate that [C]ongress had bigger
fish to fry.").
89. Donald J. Kochan, Runoff and Reality: Externalities, Economics, and Traceability Issues
in Urban Runoff Regulation, 9 CHAP. L. REV. 409, 416 (2005-2006) (citing Robert W. Adler,
Fresh Water-Toward a Sustainable Future, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10167, 10184 (2002)); Linda A.
Malone, Recent Developments Concerning Environmental Law and Agriculture, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC.
L. 341, 372 (2002) (discussing the agriculture industries opposition to proposed expansion
of nonpoint source regulation under the CWA as "a federal presumption of local land-use
policy").
90. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMM. ON REGU-
LATION AND Bus. OPPORTUNITIES, COMM. ON SMALL Bus., HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
WATER POLLUTION: MORE EPA AcTION NEEDED TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF HEAVILY
POLLUTED WATERS 11-12 (1989) (noting that 25% of assessed river miles did not fully meet
water quality standards and that "nonpoint sources are the leading current cause of failure
to support uses in the nation's lakes, streams, and estuaries").
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been devoted to strengthening the Clean Water Act's provisions for
nonpoint source pollution,91 with no effective solution in sight.
NEPA can counteract the difficulties of the Clean Water Act ap-
proach by forcing agencies to consider sources of greenhouse gas
emissions that would go largely unabated under any federal emis-
sions "cap" geared towards specific industries. Rather than
considering the environmental impacts of limited sources, NEPA
requires consideration of any environmental impact, provided that
the impact is "significant" and that it stems from a "major federal
action.""' Though it may be infeasible for regulations to target dif-
fuse or indirect sources of greenhouse gas emissions, these
emissions, like nonpoint source pollution, may still comprise a sig-
nificant portion of the nation's contributions to climate change.9 3
Thus, NEPA can help reduce the climate change impacts of other-
wise unregulated activities.
Moreover, by focusing on harmful effects9 4 rather than specific
sources, NEPA can cover sources of climate change that have re-
ceived less popular and political attention because, though they
may be significant, they are not "greenhouse gases." Focusing
exclusively on greenhouse gases results in an incomplete picture of
climate change. Scientists have identified a host of other climate
change "forcers" including "black carbon (diesel soot and
woodsmoke), tropospheric ozone (smog), and methane (natural
gas and gases from sewage treatment plants, animal feedlots, and
abandoned coal mines),"9 the reduction of which may actually
91. See, e.g., OLIVER A. HOuCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLI-
CY, AND IMPLEMENTATION (1999); Kenneth M. Murchison, Learning from More Than Five-and-
a-Half Decades of Federal Water Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C.
ENVTL. AFT. L. REv. 527 (2005); Jeffrey M. Gaba, New Source, New Growth and the Clean Water
Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 651 (2004); Michael M. Wenig, How "Total" Are "Total Maximum Daily
Loads"?-Legal Issues Regarding the Scope of Watershed-Based Pollution Control Under the Clean
Water Act, 12 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 87 (1998); David Zaring, Note, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source
Pollution, and Regulatory Control: The Clean Water Act's Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. EN-
VTL. L. REv. 515 (1996).
92. See supra note 36.
93. Transportation projects, mining activities, forest management plans, and transmis-
sion projects are just a few examples of federal projects that will not necessarily fall under a
feasible umbrella of regulated industry, but may have significant effects on greenhouse gas
emissions due to their effects on land use, commodities pricing, or other factors. See Dave
Owen, Climate Change and Environmental Assessment Law, 33 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 57, 85
(2008) (listing some state agency projects that emit greenhouse gases).
94. NEPA's procedural requirements apply only once a threshold impact has been de-
termined. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006) (requirements apply to "every
recommendation or report on ... major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment" (emphasis added)); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (2009) (defining "signifi-
cantly" as used in the NEPA context).
95. Curtis A. Moore, Existing Authorities in the United States for Responding to Global Warm-
ing, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10185, 10186 (2010).
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slow the effects of climate change more quickly than comparable
carbon dioxide reductions." If these additional forcers have a sig-
nificant impact on climate change, they too must weigh into an
agency's considerations under NEPA.
Lastly, NEPA can accommodate new scientific findings as the
body of climate change research continues to grow. 7 NEPA's
threshold definition of "significant impact" is based on current
knowledge, rather than reflecting a rigid perception of the world
at the time of the statute's drafting. As scientific understanding de-
velops, so too must the factors that go into an agency's decision-
making process. Regulations suffer a significant time lag that need
not hamper NEPA.9 8
3. Reduced Threshold Standing Inquiry for Procedural Claims
NEPA provides a way for plaintiffs to raise awareness of climate
change concerns in a federal court. Environmental plaintiffs have
long had difficulty overcoming the threshold Article III standing
inquiry, which consists of three basic requirements-injury, causa-
tion, and redressability-for all plaintiffs asserting their right to sue
in federal court." These three elements are difficult to prove in
climate change cases. For example: How can plaintiffs demonstrate
that (a) they have been personally injured by global climactic
change, (b) the defendant's actions are a cause of their climate-
96. Id. The emphasis on carbon dioxide is not unfounded, however, since carbon di-
oxide persists in the atmosphere on a timescale of 50 to 3,000 years while these other forcers
last only a few days to a few years. Id. Thus, a long-term approach to climate change mitiga-
tion necessarily must focus on reducing atmospheric carbon dioxide.
97. U.S. Gov'T AcCT. OFFICE, CLIMATE CHANGE: FEDERAL REPORTS ON CLIMATE
CHANGE FUNDING SHOULD BE CLEARER AND MORE COMPLETE, 3 (2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05461.pdf (noting a 55% increase in federal funding (ad-
justed for inflation) for climate change research between 1993 and 2004 though also noting
potential errors in federal agency reporting); see also Peter J. Lamb, Editorial, The Climate
Revolution: A Perspective, 54 CLIMATIC CHANGE 1 (2002) (describing the recent rapid advanc-
es in our understanding of the Earth's climate as a "Climate Revolution" and tracing its
development).
98. By specifying ends (an environmental policy), NEPA requires agencies to consider
new activities causing new types of harms in newly measurable ways. The Clean Air Act, in
comparison, includes an extensive "initial list" of Hazardous Air Pollutants and places the
responsibility of "periodically" updating that list with the Administrator. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(b) (1)-(3). Under this approach, a new hazardous air pollutant (or a known pollutant
with newly discovered hazardous effects) will not be regulated under the Clean Air Act with-
out administrative action. See id.
99. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 496, 536 (2007); Assoc. of Data Processing
Svc. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Environmental plaintiffs also face difficulty under
the political questions doctrine, and prudential concerns, see infra note 108, though those
will not be discussed in detail here.
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related harm when so many others contribute to the problem, and
(c) their requested remedy will redress a problem whose solution
requires coordination on a global scale? If any of these elements
are lacking, a plaintiff faces dismissal before a case can be heard on
the merits. Fortunately, plaintiffs can avoid this uncertainty by tak-
ing advantage of relaxed standing requirements when asserting
procedural claims, such as those under NEPA and the APA.oo
The differences in courts' approaches to procedural and sub-
stantive harms in a climate change lawsuit are exemplified in
Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Department of the Interi-
or.'o' Plaintiffs alleged both procedural'o2 and substantive0 3 harms
in a suit challenging a Department of Interior (DOI) action.o4
The court held that plaintiffs failed to advance their substantive
theory of standing,o'0 but the plaintiffs could still proceed under
their procedural injury claims. 0 Though recently the Second and
Fifth Circuits have allowed plaintiffs to advance substantive claims
100. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).
The Lujan Court explained:
The person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete inter-
ests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability
and immediacy. Thus ... one living adjacent to the site for proposed construction of
a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing agency's failure to
prepare an environmental impact statement, even though he cannot establish with
any certainty that the statement will cause the license to be withheld or altered, and
even though the dam will not be completed for many years.
Id.
A plaintiff asserting procedural harms can meet the redressability requirement by show-
ing that "there is some possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing
party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant." Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. at 518; see also Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 542 F.3d 1235, 1246 (9th Cir.
2008); Nulankeyutmonen Nkihtaqmikon v. Impson, 503 F.3d 18, 28 (1st Cir. 2007).
101. 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
102. Id. at 471 ("[The Department of] Interior failed to take into consideration both
the effects of climate change on [Outer Continental ShelfJ areas and the (oil and gas] Leas-
ing Program's effects on climate change. . . .").
103. Id. at 475-76 (citing adverse affects on species and ecosystems and plaintiffs' di-
minished enjoyment of both the area and its wildlife inhabitants).
104. The DOI had initiated a process to expand leasing areas for offshore oil and gas
development. See id. at 471.
105. Id. at 477-78 (finding that the plaintiffs lacked a sufficiently particularized injury
and that the asserted causal link was too tenuous).
106. In fact, the court did not even analyze causation for the procedural claims. De-
spite this holding, the court held the NEPA claims were not yet ripe for review. Id. at 480
(referencing the leasing program's multi-stage nature) ("NEPA obligations mature only
once it reaches a 'critical stage of a decision which will result in irreversible and irretriev-
able commitments of resources to an action that will affect the environment.'" (quoting
Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Forest Svc., 165 F.3d 43, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1999)) (internal
quotations omitted)).
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in climate change public nuisance suits,' other courts have dis-
missed similar claims on political question or prudential
grounds.108
By taking advantage of relaxed threshold standing requirements
for procedural harms, NEPA plaintiffs can save time and expense
in litigation. With the possibility of a proliferation of procedural
climate change lawsuits, however, it is important that NEPA be
modified or strengthened to reflect its rising importance in the
field of climate change litigation. A proposal to do so is discussed
in Part III.
B. The Bad: Tackling the Threshold Questions
This section tackles two issues that stymie our discussion of
NEPA's application in the context of climate change and help us
evaluate the need for reform. It begins with a discussion of NEPA's
international aspects, in particular the obligation of federal agen-
cies to assess the global impacts of domestic projects, as well as the
domestic impacts of international projects. This section will then
concludes with a discussion of the expressive value of NEPA and
how that shapes our view of NEPA's purpose and avenues for pos-
sible reform.
1. National Policy, Global Dilemma
What place should NEPA, the National Environmental Policy Act,
have in furthering what is now an international environmental poli-
cy dilemma? International considerations arise in NEPA in two
ways. First, how should federal agencies assess the domestic impacts
of international projects? 09 Second, how should federal agencies
107. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009); Comer v. Murphy
Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009). See generally John Schwartz, Courts as Battlefield in Cli-
mate Fight, N.Y. TiEs, Jan. 29, 2010, at Al. The Supreme Court addressed standing in
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), but referred to the "special solicitude in our
standing analysis" granted to states when protecting their quasi-sovereign interests. Id. at
520.
108. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. C 08-01138 SBA, 2008 WL
2951742 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2009); California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MIJ,
2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
109. See Joan R. Goldfarb, Note, Extraterntorial Compliance with NEPA and the Current
Wave of Environmental Alarm, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 543, 545 (1990-1991) (listing ex-
amples of international federal projects); Comment, NEPA's Role in Protecting the World
Environment, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 353, 367 (1982-1983) (discussing Agency for International
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assess the global impacts of domestic projects? Climate change
blurs the line as it concerns the location of the impact-a foreign
project that contributes significantly to climate change will have
domestic and global effects-but fortifies the lines with regards to
the sources, since activities on foreign soil may have domestic ef-
fects but remain outside of the scope of NEPA review.
The presumption against extraterritoriality for federal statutes
dictates that courts typically restrain a statute's extraterritorial
reach when its full application would conflict with foreign policy."o
When NEPA's procedural requirements implicate the sovereignty
of other nations,"' courts trim back NEPA's reach accordingly. For
example, courts specify that a NEPA lawsuit does not challenge the
project itself, which may occur on foreign soil, but rather the agen-
cy's decision-making, a truly domestic affair.11 2 Another general rule
that follows this presumption is that an EIS for a federal action
abroad need not fully analyze environmental impacts that are en-
tirely foreign."'
These rules are fairly easy to apply when impacts are localized.
Climate change, however, is the antithesis of a local impact. If a fed-
eral agency action abroad contributes increased greenhouse gas
emissions, the environmental impacts are incurred both abroad and
domestically. Global warming is just that-global The climate change
scenario thus erodes many of the foreign policy assumptions that are
Development); see, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Cal.
2007); Sierra Club v. Coleman, 405 F. Supp. 53 (D.D.C. 1975).
110. See generally Sara E. Baynard, The Extraterritorial Reach of NEPA and the Creation of a
Foreign Policy Exemption, 28 VT. L. REv. 173, 195 (2003-2004); Karen A. Klick, Note, The Extra-
territorial Reach of AEPA's EIS Requirement After Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 44 Am.
U. L. REv. 291, 294 & n.23 (1994-1995);Joio C. J. G. de Medeiros, Note, How the Presumption
Against Extraterritoriality Has Created a Gap in Environmental Protection at the 49th Parallel, 92
MINN. L. REv. 529, 549-55 (2007-2008); Comment, AEPA's Role in Protecting the World Envi-
ronment, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 353, 360-64 (1982-1983) [hereinafter AEPA's Role]. The
presumption can be rebutted where (1) Congress clearly expressed its intention to apply the
statute beyond U.S. borders, (2) neglecting to apply the statute extraterritorially would have
harmful effects inside the U.S., and (3) the statute regulates conduct that occurs within the
U.S. See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531-32 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
111. See Baynard, supra note 110, at 173 & n.7; Goldfarb, supra note 109, at 567-69.
112. See Friends of the Earth, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 908 ("In addition, Defendants do not
claim that the decisions about whether or not to support such projects occur abroad.");
Massey, 986 F.2d at 532-33; see generally AEPA's Role, supra note 110, at 370-71. This is en-
forced by the requirement that NEPA apply to "major federal actions." 42 U.S.C. § 4332
(2006).
113. See, e.g., Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions, Exec. Order No.
12,114, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1979) (waiving NEPA requirements for federal agency actions abroad);
A/EPA's Role, supra note 110, at 385-86. A recently developed exception to this rule is the
idea of global commons, areas over which no nation exercises sovereign jurisdiction or ef-
fective control. The D.C. Circuit drew on the language of global commons to hold that the
presumption against extraterritoriality for NEPA did not apply to a federal action in Antarc-
tica. Massey, 986 F.2d at 534.
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used to absolve an agency of its obligation to consider the environ-
mental impacts of an international project.1 1 4 In F7iends of the Earth v.
Mosbacher, the district court used this reasoning to require two fed-
erally chartered banks to consider the domestic climate change
impacts of the international fossil fuel exploration projects they fi-
nanced."' Friends of the Earth indicates that the global nature of
climate change may allow domestic plaintiffs to challenge a federal
agency's inadequate consideration of environmental impacts of for-
eign actions abroad when they contribute to global warming.
Unfortunately, though, the presumption against extraterritori-
ality reduces the efficacy of this environmental review. An agency
is not obligated to consider the effects of third-party actions that
the "agency has no ability to prevent ... due to its limited statuto-
ry authority, "" and courts are likely to find that an agency has
"limited statutory authority over the relevant actions"'17 when
third-party actions involve foreign nationals or their governments.
In 2003, the Eighth Circuit found that it would be "irresponsible"
for the Surface Transportation Board to approve a rail line serv-
ing new coal mines "without first examining the effects that may
occur as a result of the reasonably foreseeable increase in coal
consumption""'8 from the increased availability of low-cost coal.
The same year, a federal district court in California required the
Department of Energy to consider the foreseeable increase of
greenhouse gas emissions from a Mexican power plant following
a new federal right-of-way connecting the plant to the California
energy grid.'19 In the latter case, however, the court limited the
scope of the agency's EIS to only one of three turbines at the
plant-the one that exclusively served the California market-
while the other two, which served mainly Mexican markets,o
114. See, e.g., Harry H. Almond, The Extraterritorial Reach of United States Regulatory Author-
ity Over the Environmental Impacts of its Activities, 44 ALB. L. REv. 739, 771 (1980) ("NEPA
requirements call for substantial amounts of information [which] will have to be acquired
from the State where the action is to take place. Acquiring such information may require
substantial and costly assistance from that State, its public officials and experts.").
115. Friends of theEarth, 488 F. Supp. 2d, at 908 (pointing to the global nature of climate
change). This issue-domestic impacts-also comes up with regards to plaintiffs' standing to
sue when they can claim injury due to climate change.
116. Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 770 (2004); see also Friends of the
Earth, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 908-09 (extraterritoriality is not a bar to NEPA review, but full
environmental analysis may be limited by plaintiffs' ability to establish requisite causation).
117. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 770.
118. Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 550 (8th Cir.
2003).
119. Border Power Plant Working Grp. v. Dep't of Energy, 260 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1017
(S.D. Cal. 2003).
120. Id. at 1016 ("Two of the ... turbines are designed to produce power exclusively for
sale to a Mexican utility, and it is reasonably foreseeable that very little of this power will flow
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were excluded."' Likewise, in Sierra Club v. Clinton,"' a challenge to
a Presidential Permit for an oil pipeline bringing crude oil from
Canadian tar sands to the United States, the court held that the
increased greenhouse gas emissions from exploitation of tar sands
in Canada was outside of the scope of the EIS review.'2 3 The choice
to exploit the tar sands is part of Canada's own energy policy; an
EIS is not the proper forum to consider the interplay between
those policy choices (creating sources of heavy crude oil) and
American policy choices (creating a demand for heavy crude oil),
though they relate to both nations' contributions to climate
change. The outcome of these cases, and of others which may logi-
cally follow,'24 is that an agency's environmental analysis for a major
federal action with connections to another nation may require
consideration of all of the relevant impacts-including domestic
impacts resulting from climate change-but, because of extraterri-
toriality concerns, analysis of the sources of those impacts will
preclude effective review.
One last consideration is NEPA's role in international law. De-
spite the shortfalls in its application abroad, NEPA continues to be
pace-setting legislation for the global community. Since 1970,
eighty-seven other nations, the United Nations, the European Un-
ion, and the World Bank have adopted NEPA's statutory
framework.125 Significantly, most of these international statutes
have not followed NEPA's model of judicial oversight of agency as-
sessments, though they do emphasize different means of
restraining the natural tendency of agencies to bias an environ-
mental analysis in their favor, and acknowledge the role of public
participation in the assessment process."' This detail provides a
useful segue to the next topic of discussion, explaining the need to
through the BCP transmission line into the United States. The EA does acknowledge the
possibility that under limited circumstances, the domestic generation turbines may provide
power to the BCP line.") (citation omitted).
121. Id. at 1017 ("Because the line of causation is too attenuated between these turbines
and the federal action [,] ... the emissions of the non-export turbines were not effects of the
BCP line and ... the federal defendants were therefore under no NEPA obligation to ana-
lyze their emissions as effects of the action.").
122. Sierra Club v. Clinton, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (D. Minn. 2010).
123. Id. at 1134. The EIS already considered the increased emissions from the U.S. re-
fineries receiving the crude oil, and the court found that analysis adequate. Id. at 1134-36.
124. See Friends of the Earth v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889, 918 n.19 (N.D. Cal.
2007) ("Because the Court is unable to determine whether the alleged actions would have
gone forward without Defendants' participation and cannot determine whether Defendants
could exercise control over the projects, the Court cannot determine whether Defendants
are a legally relevant cause of the alleged effects on the domestic environment.").
125. Nicholas A. Robinson, International Trends in Environmental Impact Assessment, 19
B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 591, 597 (1991-1992); Klick, supra note 110, at 317-18 & n.253.
126. Robinson, supra note 125, at 597.
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strengthen NEPA in light of climate change despite its significant
inherent shortfalls.
2. Expressive Value of Law-Why Care About Efficacy Per Se?
"[Ilt is necessary to. .. define the 'environmental' desires of the Amer-
ican people in operational terms that the President, Government
agencies at all levels, the courts, private enterprise, and the public can
consider and act upon."'27
The previous section highlighted some relevant criticism of
NEPA's ability to fully capture the environmental impacts of federal
agency actions. Despite these criticisms, NEPA has provided a
model framework that has been copied around the globe." Does
this broad dissemination of NEPA-style legislation suggest that
NEPA is an effective statute? What can explain why, despite the
foreign policy limitations of NEPA's application to climate change,
it is nevertheless a good idea to strengthen NEPA so that it can bet-
ter address climate change? The answer to this question lies in part
with the "expressive theory of law." 29
An expressive theory of action is one that "prescribe [s] norms
for regulating the adoption of certain mental states, and ... re-
quires actions and statements to express these states adequately."'30
Rather than focusing on the achievement of certain ends, the focus
is on "whether the connection between the means and the end is
justified."3 ' An expressive theory of law, therefore, is "concerned
with evaluating [government] action."" Courts operate under the
expressive theory of law by "engag[ing] in [the] purposive inter-
pretation of laws ... ."
We can view NEPA through this lens because of the expressive
elements found in both its text and legislative history. First, the title
of the statute is the National Environmental Policy Act, not the En-
vironment Protection Act, Environmental Analysis Act, or any
127. FREDERICK R. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE NA-
TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 13 (1973) (quoting 1969 Senate Report) (footnote
omitted).
128. See supra notes 125 & 126.
129. See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503 (1999-2000).
130. Id. at 1508-09.
131. Id. at 1510 ("They ask: does performing act A for the sake of goal G express ration-
al or morally right attitudes ...
132. Id. at 1520.
133. Id.
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other title that would emphasize fixed obligation over environmen-
tal aspirations.134 The word "policy" itself connotes "a course or
principle of action"m' rather than any specific action. NEPA em-
phasizes principles of action throughout its first two sections.'
NEPA recognizes that "each person has a responsibility to contrib-
ute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment," but
seeks to further this policy only through obligations placed on fed-
eral agencies.3 7  The policy is implemented, not through
substantive requirements, but through procedural obligations, re-
flecting a belief that agencies will naturally incorporate the
expressions of environmental policy in the process of fulfilling the-
se procedural requirements.'3 8 NEPA's policy statements align with
the expressive view that rules do not prescribe maximization of cer-
tain values, but rather state or reinforce the values that frame our
actions. 3 9 Viewed in this light, NEPA reflects a belief that a law's
effects can reach beyond its direct substantive mandates-a belief
that the agencies, though not provided with formal targets, will still
strive to meet NEPA's expressive ends.o4 0 This also reflects a belief
that a growing environmental ethic, shared by the federal agencies
through "cooperation with [s]tate and local governments" 4 ' and
carefully crafted environmental analyses subject to public review,
134. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852, 852
(1970).
135. CONCISE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1109 (11th ed. 2008).
136. For example, the Congressional statement of a national environmental policy as-
serts that the federal government should be guided by knowledge of "the profound impact
of man's activity on the interrelations of all components of the natural environment," 42
U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2006), act "in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general
welfare," id., and "improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and re-
sources" to meet essential considerations of environmental policy, id. § 4331(b).
137. Id. § 4332.
138. S. REP. No. 91-296, at 13. ("Successful Federal leadership in environmental man-
agement must be based upon the best possible information and analyses .... Federal action
must rest upon a clear statement of the value and goals which we seek." (emphasis added)).
But see, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989) ("Simply
by focusing the agency's attention on the environmental consequences of a proposed project, NEPA
ensures that important effects will not be overlooked or underestimated ... [and] the re-
quirement that agencies prepare detailed impact statements inevitably bring pressure to bear on
agencies to respond to the needs of environmental quality." (emphasis added) (quotations
and citations omitted)). The legislative intent indicates a desire for the policy to be a start-
ing point for all agency decisions, while the courts focus on the procedural aspects.
139. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 129, at 1512. ("[E]xpressive theories are like the
rules of grammar or logic. Those rules do not tell us to maximize the amount of correct
grammatical or logical statements in the world, as if that itself were the goal. Instead, those
rules tell us that when we are speaking or reasoning, we should do so subject to certain regu-
lative constraints.").
140. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION: THE NATIONAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLICY ACT § 2.04 (1985 & Supp. 1991).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a).
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will enforce the message that the task of environmental preserva-
tion belongs to "each person."4 2
NEPA's legislative history further supports this expressive view. It
indicates that the drafters hoped the statute would contribute to a
"more orderly, rational, and constructive Federal response to envi-
ronmental decisionmaking. . . ."" They hoped it would be largely
self-policing, accomplished with minimal interference by the
courts.14 Rather than a conscious decision to limit NEPA's efficacy,
omissions of substantive provisions reflected a legislative desire to
emphasize the expressive elements of the National Environmental
Policy Act over realization of any fixed environmental goal. 4 5
The expressive theory sidesteps one criticism of broadening
NEPA's applicability to complex and synergistic environmental
problems: the numerous constraints faced when using it to man-
date "wise" environmental decision-making. 4 6 Since expressive
rules focus on values rather than specific results, a law aimed at
expressive principles should shift the discourse accordingly. Such a
law is not a failure merely because application of its principles is
difficult or because consequential goals have not been reached.
"[E]xpressive constraints.. . are not justified in terms of the end
state they permit or produce functionally, but in terms of how well
142. Id. § 4331(c). See also Danielle Keats Citron, Law's Expressive Value in Combating
Cyber Gender Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REv. 373, 407 (2009) (describing how law creates a
public set of meanings and shared understanding between states and the public that have
"an important cultural impact that differs from its more direct coercive effects").
143. S. REP. No. 91-296, at 9.
144. The legislature specifically deleted "congressional recognition of each person's
fundamental inalienable right to a healthful environment," S. REP. No. 91-296, at 19, in
order to avoid creating ajudicially enforceable right. MANDELKER, supra note 140, at § 2.02
(1985 & Supp. 1991). It should be noted that, at the time, the creation of a cause of action
to enforce an individual right to a healthful environment was a radical concept. NEPA pre-
ceded the seminal Supreme Court case on third-party environmental standing, Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972), and the citizen-suit provisions that are now prevalent in
major environmental statutes. See 16 U.S.C. § 1 54 0(g) (2006) (Endangered Species Act); 33
U.S.C. § 1365 (2006) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006) (Clean Air Act). See also
Sam Kalen, The Devolution of NEPA: How the APA Transformed the Nation's Environmental Policy,
33 Wm. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 483, 489 (2008-2009).
145. See, e.g., Anderson & Pildes, supra note 129, at 1510-11 (contrasting expressive
theory with the "consequentialist approach," which approves of any mean that produces the
"best" results). Alternatively, the absence of these provisions can be read as a failure to fore-
cast important developments in the evolution of environmental and administrative law
rather than a conscious decision to limit NEPA's substantive requirements. Jason J.
Czarnezki, Revisiting the Tense Relationship Between the U.S. Supreme Court, Administrative Proce-
dure, and the National Environmental Policy Act, 25 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 9 n.32 (2006).
146. See, e.g., supra notes 26-29 (lack of substantive mandate); supra notes 65-67 (high
degree of agency deference); supra notes 118-120 (difficulties in extraterritorial applica-
tion); infra notes 156-173 (problems of agency bias).
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they interpret and protect the underlying values that ground the
constraints.
NEPA provides six such "underlying values," the first of which is
the obligation of the federal government to "fulfill the responsibili-
ties of each generation as trustee of the environment for
succeeding generations."'4 8 Adequate consideration of climate
change fits neatly into this aspirational box. Climate change is truly
a multi-generational problem; record high measures of atmospher-
ic greenhouse gases today are the result of changes in land use,
energy use, and industry that have been developing since the In-
dustrial Revolution. 149The sources of climate change are thus not
the result of our generation, but generations past. The mirror im-
age is also true: unlike changes in air and water quality or the
decreasing presence of impacted species, climate change impacts
are removed in both place and time from the project itself. Future
generations, not our own, will shoulder the burden of coping with
the impacts of actions we benefit from today. Additionally, pro-
posals to remedy climate change largely center around vast
changes to the way we live our lives now, which are both politically
unpopular and require overcoming a great deal of social inertia. A
shift in approach to environmental problems that starts at the top,
if sufficiently expressive, can have a trickle-down effect through
state and local levels, sufficient to strengthen support for policy
changes that will shake the current framework at its foundations.'50
In addition to framing NEPA in a way which makes its substan-
tive deficiencies more tolerable in light of advancing important
environmental values, the expressive approach sheds light on a
new way to view NEPA's aims and, more importantly, new avenues
with which to strengthen it. If, as expressive theories of law would
have it, NEPA aims to legislate values that shape our actions rather
than achieve specific results, the law should be concerned with how
accurately the agency actions effectuate the values sought by sec-
tion 101 of NEPA, and not with the way an agency follows the
procedures outlined in the statute. Though NEPA should not, and
147. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 129, at 1561.
148. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (b)(1) (2006).
149. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
150. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 943, 1006-07
(1995) ("[Slince there is no clear individual mechanism to erode them, if institutions that
have become inefficient are to die, often they must be changed. But ... it will rarely be in
the interest of any individual to act to change an inefficient institution. Often, moreover,
there will be no collective entity that can act to change it for the collective as a whole. Thus
the inefficient institution is stuck, till shaken free from this equilibrium."). One technique
for changing social meanings is "to induce actions that tend either to undermine or to con-
struct a particular social meaning." Id. at 1013.
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was never intended to, allow plaintiffs and courts to interject them-
selves into an agency's decision-making process,'"' it should be
strengthened so that the agency's actions reflect the expressive
aims of NEPA-that environmental values should pervade the
agency's decision-making process, rather than be inserted as a
mere "check-the-box" formality.52
C. The Ugly: Climate Change Exacerbates NEPA's Shortcomings
NEPA has successfully brought disclosure of environmental im-
pacts to the forefront of agency decision-making. It has also
granted environmental plaintiffs a valid cause of action to delay
projects pending adequate consideration of environmental im-
pacts. Though these two elements are important, they fall short of
both what NEPA was intended to do and what it can do: ensure that
agencies adequately consider the environmental impacts of their
actions and adjust their behavior accordingly.5 As this section will dis-
cuss, judges grant vast deference to agency NEPA determinations
based on assumptions of agency expertise and behavior that do not
hold in the modern environmental administrative state. Further,
the nature of climate change exacerbates these problems. Ulti-
mately, this section will show that agencies may not be well-
positioned to judge the sufficiency of their own environmental
151. See supra note 30 (demonstrating how NEPA's balancing language prevents plain-
tiffs and courts from using the statute to accomplish specific substantive results).
152. See Noelle Straub, CEQ Chief Urges Agencies to Freshen Approach to NEPA, GREENWIRE
(Mar. 23, 2009), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2009/03/23/4/. A critical and objec-
tive approach to analyzing the true impacts of an agency's project is a fundamental
component of NEPA's expressive aims. One example of "box-checking" is when agencies
insert the most convenient, rather than most accurate, scientific analysis into an EIS-
sufficient to constitute a "hard look," but insufficient to inform the public and the agency
itself about the true environmental impacts of its actions. The expressive values of NEPA are
not being met in this case because the public is denied its chance to be fully apprised of the
role environmental impacts play in an agency's decision.
153. On NEPA's 10-year anniversary, William Hedeman, Jr., the Director of EPA's Of-
fice of Environmental Review, remarked that NEPA was "still respected and ... capable of
offering much opportunity to protect the environment in the future," but admitted that
most NEPA "litigation has focused on procedural compliance with the requirements of
NEPA rather than getting to the basic substantive mandates of the Congress as reflected in
NEPA's goals and policies." The National Environmental Policy Act: An Interiew With William
Hedeman, Jr., EPA JOURNAL (1980), http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/nepa/02.htm. Fif-
teen years later, a CEQ study acknowledged NEPA's success as an information-forcing
statute, but concluded that NEPA implementation had fallen short of its goals. COUNCIL ON
ENVTL. QUALITY, ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ACT: A STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, at iii (1997) [hereinafter
NEPA EFFECTIVENESS] (noting that agencies often treated the EIS as "an end in itself, rather
than a tool to enhance and improve decision-making" and finding that agencies often "en-
gage in consultation only after a decision has-for all practical purposes-been made").
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analyses that may endanger the ultimate success of their own major
actions-an assertion that sets the stage for the reform that follows.
1. Agency Discretion and Absurd Results
In NEPA lawsuits, courts and agencies focus on the form of their
environmental analyses over the function. 4 Though a scientifically
defensible but otherwise insincere effort at environmental analysis
seems contrary to the expressive purposes of NEPA in general, and
section 101 in particular, courts are hamstrung by the "arbitrary
and capricious" standard of review and decades of Supreme Court
precedent. 155 The following results are all possible under the
Court's current interpretation of NEPA's requirements:
Agencies Disregard NEPA's Expressive Purpose. Though NEPA does
not require "environmental concerns [to] trump all others,"56 it
seems inconsistent with section 101 of NEPA to hold that an agen-
cy's other interests should consistently trump environmental
concerns. But that is what occurs under "hard look" review.15 In
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,5 8 the Supreme Court hy-
pothesized an absurd result-the complete decimation of a species
as a result of a federal action-that passes muster under NEPA
simply because the agency knew what it was getting into.'" The
Court endorsed this interpretation of NEPA notwithstanding that
such an action is "unwise."'60 An agency's unwise decision, com-
bined with judicial complacency to let such decisions stand, stands
in direct opposition to NEPA's expressive purpose. How can NEPA
successfully "interpret and protect . .. underlying values"',6 ' when it
allows those very values to be disregarded? As the first appellate
court opinion on NEPA so aptly put it, to read the EIS requirement
154. This is the check-the-box approach criticized by CEQ Chair Nancy Sutley. See
Straub, supra note 152.
155. See generally Czarnezki, supra note 31, at 10-12.
156. Border Power Plant Working Grp. v. Dep't of Energy, 467 F. Supp. 2d. 1040, 1059
(S.D. Cal. 2006).
157. See Sunstein, supra note 54, at 181. The reviewing court ensures only that the
"look" occurred, and that it appears to have been "hard." Rather than evaluate the strength
of an agency's conclusion, the logic of their reasoning, or the precise balance given to agen-
cy considerations, the court will defer as long as the considerations themselves-the "hard
looks" -are well-reasoned. Id.
158. 490 U.S. 332 (1989).
159. Id. at 351 ("NEPA merely prohibits uninformed-rather than unwise-agency ac-
tion.").
160. For good retrospective accounts of how courts have viewed NEPA's statement of
environmental policy, see Kalen, supra note 144; Yost, supra note 14.
161. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 129, at 1561.
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as requiring "no more than the physical act of passing certain fold-
ers and papers, unopened, to reviewing officials along with other
folders and papers" would be to read the requirement "so narrowly
as to make the Act ludicrous." 1 2
An EIS is valuable because it informs the public of those instanc-
es where an agency's preferred alternative is one with serious
environmental consequences. Agencies are political instruments and
their actions and decisions are both vulnerable to and influenced by
public scrutiny. Public scrutiny of agency decisions, in turn, can be
one alternative to judicial enforcement of NEPA's procedural
mandate. However, the value that public awareness brings to ful-
filling NEPA's expressive environmental policy is worth only as
much as the value of the analysis contained within an agency EIS.
Agencies Employ Suspect Science. Because courts will defer to the
technical expertise of the agencies conducting environmental
analyses, the "arbitrary and capricious" and "hard look" standards
of review leave reasonable choice of science to the agency. While
plaintiffs may submit additional scientific data that directly chal-
lenges the scientific basis upon which the agency's conclusion rests,
the agency is obligated to give the new information only the requi-
site "hard look."'6 3 The agency, as promulgator of the impact
statement, has the advantage of putting forth its preferred version
of the relevant science first, with the risk that an EIS, rather than
providing an objective view of environmental impacts, may just be
used to "set[] forth certain facts in certain forms, regardless of
what the real facts may be."' In Conservation Northwest v. Rey,1
both the court and the plaintiffs disagreed with the agency's scien-
162. SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 86 (1984) (quoting Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1117-18 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
163. Conservation Nw. v. Rey, 674 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1253 (W.D. Wash. 2009); Spiller v.
White, 352 F.3d 235, 243 (5th Cir. 2003) ("Where conflicting evidence is before the agency,
the agency and not the reviewing court has the discretion to accept or reject from the sever-
al sources of evidence.") (citation omitted); Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 753 F.2d
120, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (noting that it is "clearly within the expertise and discretion of the
agency to determine proper testing methods").
164. RICHARD A. LIROFF, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: NEPA AND ITS
AFTERMATH 99 (1976) (quoting 1972 statement by Congressman Dingell) (citation omit-
ted). See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 399 F. Supp. 2d 386,
407 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (NEPA requires only that a FONSI be based on adequate scientific data;
courts cannot require agencies to use the best scientific methodology available); see alsoJoe
Weston, EIA in a Risk Society, 47J. ENVTL. PLANNING & MGMT. 313, 316-17 (2004) (describ-
ing science's vulnerability to manipulation by interested parties as an "inherent weakness" of
the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process).
165. 674 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (W.D. Wash. 2009).
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tific determination,'6 6 but the "hard look" review precluded their
judgments from prevailing in place of a reasoned agency deci-
sion. Despite its unstable scientific footing, the EIS was held to be
valid with respect to its considerations of climate change.'
Agencies Use EIS toJustify Foregone Conclusions. Agencies have discre-
tion over when they begin the EIS process. CEQ regulations specify
only that it must be early enough in the process to ensure effective
review.69 The agency's decision can have a significant effect on the
170success of the process as a whole, particularly as it concerns the
effectiveness of an agency's analysis and selection of a preferred ac-
tion from a list of reasonable alternatives."' If started too late, the
"agency and private sector planning processes" have progressed to
the point where "alternatives and strategic choices are foreclosed."7 1
Unfortunately, though courts can criticize agencies' "sunk cost"
strategies, the equitable nature of a remedy under NEPA (an in-
junction, pending adequate environmental review) combined with
the statute's lack of substantive mandates limits judicial action
where substantial agency investment has already occurred.73
166. The EIS concluded that the Forest Plan management activities would have a de
minimis impact on global climate change. Id. at 1253 (noting that the "Agencies' conclu-
sions may be conclusory and even incorrect" and that the "Plaintiffs (and even the Court)
may be inclined to disagree with the Agencies").
167. Id. (nothing that the agencies were only required, "at the maximum, to disclose
the opposing viewpoint and explain their decision").
168. Id.
169. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.5 & 1508.23 (2009).
170. NEPA EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 153, at 11 ("How early an agency integrates
NEPA into its internal planning will dramatically affect the length of time for approval, the
cost, and the ultimate success of a proposal.").
171. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2009) (defining the section on selection of a preferred action
as "the heart of the environmental impact statement").
172. NEPA EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 153, at 11; see also Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135,
1142 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that an agency's NEPA analysis must not be taken "as an exer-
cise in form over substance, and not as a subterfuge designed to rationalize a decision
already made"); Arlington Coal. on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1333-34 (4th Cir. 1972)
("Once the ... planning process has reached these latter stages, flexibility in selecting alter-
native plans has to a large extent been lost.... Either the [agency] will have to undergo a
major expense in making alterations in a completed [plan] or the environmental harm will
have to be tolerated. It is all too probable that the latter result would come to pass.") (cita-
tions omitted); David E. Cole, Note, judicial Discretion and the "Sunk Costs" Strategy of
Government Agencies, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 689, 689-95 (2002-2003) (citing the Tellico
Dam project as an example of this type of behavior in the context of the Endangered Spe-
cies Act).
173. See Cole, supra note 172, at 717-18. Courts generally will deny relief if the pro-
posed project has progressed too far before the plaintiff files suit. See generally, Wendy B.
Davis, The Fox is Guarding the Henhouse: Enhancing the Role of the EPA in FONSI Determinations
Pursuant to AEPA, 39 AKRON L. REV. 35, 46-48 (2006).
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2.Judicial Deference and Assumptions About Agency Behavior
Lack of judicial enforcement of NEPA's substantive provisions
perpetuates agency behavior that is inconsistent with the national
environmental policy set forth in NEPA's opening section. An ob-
jective evaluation of environmental impacts is a key component of
NEPA's expressive purpose. 1A biased analysis allows an agency to
downplay its own impacts, undermining the information-
generating component of an EIS and reducing NEPA's efficacy as a
tool to harmonize federal actions with the realities of limited envi-
ronmental resources. Unfortunately, the judiciary is bound by
longstanding tenets of agency discretion, which limit judges' ability
to enforce objective scientific analysis. This section discusses the
assumptions about agency behavior guiding judicial deference and
demonstrate how these assumptions often fail when an agency
promulgates an EIS.
Deferential judicial review in the context of environmental deci-
sions is guided by assumptions about agency behavior, namely: (1)
that agencies have the technical expertise to assess the scientific
issues that arise in an EIS,17 5 (2) that agencies are competent to
evaluate an EIS in furtherance of the national environmental poli-
cy, and (3) that agencies will independently exercise their NEPA
obligations to the fullest extent possible.
Agencies Lack Technical Expertise. Judicial review is rooted in the
APA's deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard, which itself is
premised on the notion that judges lack the agency's "high level
of . .. expertise" 7 6 and must defer to its judgment in technical mat-
ters.'7 ' Although agencies are in a better position than courts of
general jurisdiction to evaluate scientific issues arising from envi-
ronmental analyses, it does not follow that agencies necessarily
174. See Metcalf 214 F.3d at 1142.
175. See Susannah T. French, Note, judicial Review of the Administrative Record in NEPA
Litigation, 81 CAL. L. REV. 929,930 (2003).
176. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976); see also FCC v. Fox Television Sta-
tions, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1826 (2009) ("There should be a strong presumption that the
[agency's] initial views, reflecting the informed judgment of independent commissioners
with expertise in the regulated area, also reflect the views of the Congress that delegated the
[agency] authority to flesh out details not fully defined in the enacting statute.").
177. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) ("When
examining this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a
reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential."). But see French, supra note 175, at
pt. III.B (arguing that such deference in NEPA may be unwarranted due to NEPA's broad
mandate and its application to all agencies, even those without specific environmental ex-
pertise).
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have expertise in every NEPA determination." This is because
NEPA is a general statute; its broad mandate applies to all federal
agencies, many of which do not inherently have scientific, much
less environmental, expertise."' Agencies are authorized to con-
tract environmental expertise by hiring third parties to complete
their environmental analyses, but this approach raises other con-
cerns, such as the possibility that a third party may be better at
writing compliant papers than at recommending appropriate ac-
tions.'8 o
Agencies Are Not Competent to Make Fully Informed Decisions. An
agency that possesses the technical expertise to evaluate scientific
issues in an EIS may still lack the resources to fully apply that ex-
pertise. This is because "NEPA imposes duties on agencies; agencies
do not exist to administer NEPA."'s' While the cost of NEPA com-
pliance may be a small percentage of total project costs for
complex projects, it can become proportionately higher and more
burdensome for smaller projects. 8 2 In response to limited re-
sources, agencies may abbreviate the EIS process in ways that may
be judicially defensible but scientifically incomplete.
Agencies Do Not Independently Incorporate NEPA Mandates.14 NEPA
may lack a stricter provision for judicial scrutiny because Congress
assumed that agencies would incorporate the Act's environmental
178. See, e.g., French, supra note 175, at 960 n.200 (citing Park County Res. Council, Inc.
v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 817 F.2d 609, 620 (10th Cir. 1987)).
179. See, e.g., Administration of the National Environmental Policy Act-1972: Appendix to
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 92nd Cong. 1 (1972) (After NEPA, some agencies "urgently need [ed]
the development of entirely new in-house research machinery or broadened assistance of
outside consultants in order to carry out adequate environmental analysis"); supra note _
(NEPA also requires agencies to consider alternatives that fall outside their particular area
of expertise).
180. Davis, supra note 173, at 54 ("The hired expert may be more skilled in paper com-
pliance than in the management and mitigation of harm to the environment. It is not
reasonable to expect a hired contractor to undermine the desires of its employer by empha-
sizing adverse environmental harm or criticizing the proposed project.") (citing Matthew J.
Lindstrom, Procedures Without Purpose: The Withering Away of the National Environmental Policy
Act's Substantive Law, 20 J. LAND RES. & ENvrL. L. 245 (2000)).
181. Park County Res. Council v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 817 F.2d 609, 620 (10th Cir.
1987).
182. See CHARLES H. EGGLESTON, THE NEPA PLANNING PROCESS: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE WITH EMPHASIS ON EFFICIENCY 374-77 (1999).
183. For example, budget constraints have led the Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
to limit its range of alternatives considered for all land use planning projects to four fixed
management options. The Role of NEPA in the Intermountain States: Oversight Field Hearing Before
the Comm. on Res., 109th Cong. 29 (2005) (statement of Dave Brown, Regional Regulatory
Advisor (Rocky Mountain Region), BP America, Inc.).
184. But see Davis, supra note 173, at 37-38 & nn.14-18 (noting some views that the EPA
should incorporate NEPA mandates).
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mandate into their decision-making processes.' 8 This expressive
hope that "environmental awareness and responsibility would be
infused into the very fabric of the federal government" 6 has not
turned out as Congress intended.1 17 NEPA's statutory mandate for
environmental considerations is not the only guiding mandate im-
posed on agencies; environmental concerns often clash with
"existing agency missions, and NEPA's language does little to
resolve the conflict. As one court said, "there is always the risk that
a government official who originates a project may be too partial
toward it to be completely objective in weighing environmental
objections to it,"'89 and NEPA leaves an agency with the full discre-
tion to "resolve uncertainties in favor of the priorities set out in its
original grant of authority."'9 o Though NEPA's procedural re-
quirements force an agency to disclose impacts and consider
alternatives that may have less harmful environmental impacts, the
agency's mission-and desire to pursue its project through its pre-
ferred method-may lead it to apply a set of criteria used to justify
a decision to the public that has already been reached on other
grounds.'9 For example, the Army Corps of Engineers refused to
185. ANDERSON, supra note 127, at 257 (reflecting the hope that NEPA would "change []
the congressionally recognized tendency of federal decision making toward environmental
neglect and destruction") (footnote omitted).
186. ANDERSON, supra note 127, at 291.
187. See, e.g., id. at 288 ("The impression we have is that with few exceptions the agen-
cies have not yet begun to take NEPA's substantive mandate very seriously. In general they
have complied by preparing superficial analyses of environmental impact, usually after basic
proposals were well along in agency review processes."). This is not surprising, given that
agencies' reluctance to fully consider the environmental effects of their actions was one of
the motivating forces behind NEPA's passage. Id. at 13. See also LIROFF, supra note 164, at
125 ("[I]n the response of the [Atomic Energy Commission] before Calvert Cliffs' in the
response of the [Federal Power Commission] before Greene County, and in the response of
the [Federal Highway Administration], one sees the Neanderthal reaction of development-
oriented agencies, secure in their niches, not caring to concern themselves with the poten-
tially troublesome environmental implications of their work. A lack of concern for NEPA was
evidenced as well among those agencies seemingly committed to environmental quality.").
At the 2005 Oversight Field Hearings, a representative of the Zuni Tribe reflected that
"[firom our perspective, [the Office of Surface Mining] views itself as a promoter rather
than a regulator of the coal industry and was either unable or unwilling to comprehend or
properly address the religious and cultural concerns of Native Americans. Likewise, envi-
ronmental considerations raised by conservation organizations were given little credence."
The Role of NEPA in the Intermountain States: Oversight Field Hearing Before the Comm. on Res.,
109th Cong. 67 (2005) (statement of Calbert A. Seciwa, Pueblo of Zuni Tribal Member,
Former Member of the Zuni Salt Lake Coalition).
188. ANDERSON, supra note 127, at 257; see generally Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do:
How to Deal with the Dysfunctions ofMultiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2009).
189. County of Suffolk v. Sec'y of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1390 (2d Cir. 1977).
190. ANDERSON, supra note 127, at 257.
191. Id.; see also N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Bu-
reaucratic rationalization and ... momentum are real dangers . . . ."); Davis, supra note 173,
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prepare an EIS for a dredging project off the Louisiana coast even
after the Corps determined that the environmental impacts would
be "significant."9'
3. Climate Change Exacerbates the Problems of
Deferential Review and Agency Discretion
The special complexities of climate change science-sources, ef-
fects, and global status-exacerbate the ineptness of assumptions
about agency behavior described in Part II.C.2, supra. This makes
the likelihood of absurd results-those defined as judicially plausi-
ble under a deferential standard of review but inconsistent with
NEPA's expressive purpose and statement of environmental poli-
cy-all the more likely in the climate change context.
a. Expertise
Agencies are not climate change experts and have not, until re-
cently, been asked to consider the climate change impacts of their
activities as part of their NEPA (or other statutory) obligations.'
Furthermore, climate change analyses are complex and tech-
nical.194 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that it will be at its
most deferential when an agency is acting on the "frontiers of sci-
ence."'95 Yet it is at these frontiers where agencies are most
susceptible to either (1) honest but significant errors in the cor-
rect choice of science, or (2) cherry-picking the model that best
at 49 ("Allowing the lead agency that is promoting the project to determine environmental
risks is like allowing the fox to guard the henhouse.").
192. See NEPA: Lessons Learned and Next Steps: Oversight Hearing Before the Comm. on Res.,
109th Cong. 25-26 (2005) ("Often an agency simply does not follow the law .... In order to
safeguard its coast, the State of Louisiana had to go to court to prevent the Corps from
flaunting the Congressional command. The State was successful in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the 5th Circuit in New Orleans in enforcing NEPA.") (citing Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d
1081 (5th Cir. 1985)).
193. See Memorandum from Nancy H. Sutley, Chair, Council on Envtl. Quality to Heads
of Fed. Dep'ts and Agencies (Feb. 18, 2010), available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/
Consideration-ofEffects-of GHGDraftNEPAGuidanceFINAL_02182010.pdf.
194. See, e.g., supra note 4.
195. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983); Sierra
Club v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 753 F.2d 120, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("[T]he court is not to rule
on the relative merits of competing scientific opinion [s]. The agency is entrusted with the
responsibility of considering the various modes of scientific evaluation and theory and
choosing the one appropriate for the given circumstances. The court's responsibility lies in
assuring that the agency had before it all the data to make an informed decision that ade-
quately took account of the important environmental concerns.") (citation omitted).
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fits the desired conclusion. 96 Both of these outcomes would be
contrary to the aims of NEPA, but not within the power of the ju-
diciary to account for and minimize.
b. Competency
Even an agency that has diligently adhered to the NEPA frame-
work and has a large staff of environmental analysts or list of
preferred third-party contractors will face new challenges if asked
to consider climate change impacts of its actions as well. Addition-
ally, extraterritorial considerations limit an agency's ability to both
gather and consider relevant studies in certain situations, regard-
less of resources or technical competency.9 7
c. Effectiveness of Public Disclosure
As discussed earlier, agencies are often reticent to consider envi-
ronmental concerns that may conflict with or impair their own
statutory mandates. NEPA calls for a check on this behavior through
its emphasis on public involvement,'" which is most effective when
the objectionable environmental impact is imminent, particularized,
and will directly affect the local community. Because climate change
impacts may occur at times and places far removed from the agency
project, public comments regarding climate change may have little
impact on actual agency decision-making.
d. Self-interest
Analysis of an action's climate change impacts may jeopardize
the core of an agency project, rather than its particular manifesta-
tion. For example, in Mid States Coalition for Progress v. Surface
Transportation Board, the project's "foreseeable" impacts due to
greenhouse gas emissions arose because the purpose of the action
was to provide rail transport for coalmines.'9" Other environmental
196. See Charles D. Case, Problems in judicial Review Arising from the Use of Computer Models
and Other Quantitative Methodologies in Environmental Decisionmaking, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REv. 251, 277 (1982) (explaining the vulnerability of analysis by agencies and experts as
"susceptibl[e] ... to manipulative distortion").
197. See supra Part II.B.1.
198. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.7 & 1506.6 (2009).
199. Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 549 (8th Cir.
2003).
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concerns could be mitigated by altering the agency's choice of
route, but the concern about climate change could not. This ten-
dency to jeopardize the core of an agency's project may well entice
an agency to downplay or ignore climate change impacts.
III. REFORM
This Section sets forth a reform that is intended to ensure that
agencies' environmental analyses under NEPA reflect accurate,
honest, and thorough scientific information; that federal agencies
internalize NEPA's expressive environmental values; and that the
occurrence of absurd results due to deferential review and agency
deficiencies are diminished. This can be accomplished by assuring
that agencies' EIS are supported by the best science, rather than
the most convenient science.
As an added bonus, by seeking to oversee rather than control,
and to enforce rather than coerce, this reform may be more politi-
cally feasible than current iterations of environmental legislation.
The suggestions below leave the tough policy choices and ultimate
decision-making in the hands of the expert agency, while ensuring
that the public receives and the agencies utilize the most objective
scientific information possible. Further, this method of systematic
oversight strengthens NEPA's expressive aims. The use of honest
science depoliticizes the information-forcing aspect of an agency's
EIS. By forcing agencies to use the most accurate, rather than the
most convenient, information available, agencies are able to fully
disclose how their proposed project fits into the lofty goals out-
lined in NEPA's statement of a national environmental policy.
Overcoming NEPA's Shortcomings
NEPA's successes"' are tempered by difficulties in ensuring that
agencies actually adjust their decisions based on impacts revealed
in environmental analyses. Though much criticism has focused on
how the Supreme Court has severed NEPA's substantive policy
goals from its procedural mandates,o' this emphasis is, to some
200. These successes include increased information generation by agencies, public in-
volvement in agency decisions through the EIS process, and availability of a private right of
action to challenge federal projects pending adequate environmental review.
201. See, e.g., MATrHEW J. LINDSTROM & ZACHARY A. SMITH, THE NATIONAL ENvIRON-
MENTAL POLICY ACT: JUDICIAL MISCONSTRUCTION, LEGISLATIVE INDIFFERENCE & ExECuTIVE
NEGLECT 3 (2001); Yost, supra note 14, at 534 (criticizing the Supreme Court's "near oblite-
ration of substantive review").
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extent, misplaced. Even if NEPA could be read to impose substan-
tive environmental goals on federal agencies, courts of general
jurisdiction could not weigh the merits of an agency's scientific
conclusions against those of objecting scientists and citizens. The
deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review can guard
against the most egregious agency violations-for example, where
an agency has failed to fully consider relevant information, or
where agencies' written conclusions are contrary to their proffered
scientific evidence.202 But judicial review, even if less deferential,
cannot guard against other more nuanced actions, both intention-
al and accidental, that subvert NEPA's statement of environmental
policy and reduce an EIS to mere "box-checking." In light of that,
this Note proposes an external layer of agency review-an expert
Office of Environmental Analysis (the Office)-designed to have
both the expertise and objectivity necessary to ensure that agencies
promote national environmental values while properly utilizing the
most appropriate science.
Agencies are under tremendous pressure to shirk adherence to
an environmental policy that stalls projects, costs money, strains
limited resources, and conflicts with the particular agency's own
statutory mandates. Reforms that will enforce a stricter standard of
agency compliance with their environmental mandate are neces-
sary. Though NEPA cannot (and should not) put a halt to the
203
multitude of federal actions that impact the natural world, it can
ensure that agency actions properly reflect environmental values
and accurate scientific analysis. The awareness that federal actions
must be accomplished in recognition of "the profound impact of
man's activity on the interrelations of all components of the natu-
ral environment"204 is the expressive value of NEPA, and one that
will be solidified through the reform proposed in this Note. Like
courts, the Office of Environmental Analysis will not interject its
own preferred policy in place of an agency's reasoned balancing of
needs and costs. However, unlike courts, the Office will have the
capacity to interject its objective view of the most accurate science,
based on reasoned analysis and understanding of the technical
complexities inherent in even the most basic EIS.
202. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983).
203. NEPA also seeks to protect other resources, including cultural, historical, and ar-
chaeological aspects of our national heritage. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(4) (2006).
204. Id. § 4331(a) (expressing NEPA's goal that "man and nature ... exist in productive
harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future
generations of Americans").
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NEPA's expressive value is even more important in light of cli-
mate change considerations. In addition to the benefits of NEPA's
impact-based, forward-thinking, scientifically flexible approach,20"
agency consideration of climate change impacts through NEPA
reinforces the federal government's commitment to, and aware-
ness of, climate change and sustainable development.2 06 Under the
expressive theory, the effects of this commitment extend beyond
better federal decision-making: first, it could influence state and
local governments, industry, and even individuals, who should rec-
ognize their own "responsibility to contribute to the preservation
and enhancement of the environment" ;207 second, accurate envi-
ronmental analyses (rather than analyses carefully crafted to justify
already committed resources) 208 can provide policymakers and the
public with a body of accurate information to aid in their consider-
ation of drastic changes to transportation and utility infrastructures
that may be necessary as climate change advances, but should not
be embarked upon hastily;209 third, a strong federal commitment to
accurate environmental analysis and honest consideration of envi-
ronmental factors could provide the proverbial "swift kick to
,,21 0
catapult us out of our parochial comfort zones and prepare the
American people politically for alterations in development pat-
terns, transportation choices, and energy consumption that will be
necessary to limit climate change impacts. 211 Climate change
205. See supra Part II.A.
206. See, e.g., LINDSTROM & SMIH, supra note 201, at 8 (noting that NEPA was intended
to "legislate[] values, not through a regulatory mandate but through a national declara-
tion").
207. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c); see, e.g., Paula Dittrick, Studies Call for Climate Change Policy from
Government, OIL & GAS J., May 26, 2008, at 30 (indicating industry leaders are aware of the
need for change and are looking for government to lead the way). Many states are already
using their "little NEPAs"-state environmental assessment statutes modeled on NEPA's
framework-as "NEPAs-plus" by incorporating substantive requirements and incorporating
climate change considerations. See Madeline June Kass, Little NEPAs Take on Climate Goliath,
23 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 40, 41-42 (Fall 2008); see also supra notes 128-129 (NEPA as a
model in the international field).
208. See, e.g., supra notes 172-176
209. See Tim O'Riordan, Editorial, Tipping Points: Malign and Benign?, 52 ENV'T 2
(2010).
210. Susan G. Stafford et al., Now is the Time for Action: Transitions and Tipping Points in
Complex Environmental Systems, 52 ENV'T 39, 42 (2010).
211. For example, the American Clean Energy and Security Act, passed by the House in
June of 2009, called for utilities to meet 20% of their electricity demand through use of
renewable sources by 2020 and a 17% emissions reduction from 2005 levels by 2020. See
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). The 2007
IPCC assessment identified a list of key mitigation technologies and practices by sector,
indicating the scope of potential changes across the economy. INTERGOV'T PANEL ON CLI-
MATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE at 10 tbl.SPM.3 &
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provides a second impetus for expressive reform: climate change
magnifies the pressures that currently limit an agency's implemen-
tation of environmental policy,2 12 which increases the likelihood
that current agency approaches will be largely ineffectual despite
judicial decisions and CEQ guidance to the contrary.
B. The Benefits of External Agency Review
External agency review is necessary because courts lack the ex-
pertise and individual agencies lack the objectivity necessary to
ensure that self-interest and inaccuracy do not pervade the NEPA
process.
Judicial Reforms. Much of the current NEPA scholarship has fo-
cused on the Supreme Court's interpretation of NEPA and its
relationship with the APA." The overwhelming precedent of
fourty years of NEPA litigation necessarily influences any call for
judicial reforms: the entrenched APA deferential standard of re-
view, as well as the focus on procedural action, would be difficult to
change. Moreover, though some environmental analyses may be
accessible to judges without technical backgrounds (impact on
plant and animal species, acreage of wetland impacts, destruction
of scenic or aesthetic resources, etc.), many analyses (including
climate change scenarios) are complex." The reliability of an
agency's analysis relies in part on the reliability of the science it
utilized. Unfortunately, NEPA is silent with regard to defining the
contours of reliable "science" 15 and the judiciary must, for reasons
of propriety, defer to agency decisions. The problems inherent in
relying on courts of general jurisdiction 2  for overseeing scientific
ch. 11 (B. Metz et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications-and-data/
ar4/wg3/en/contents.html.
212. See supra Parts II.B.1, II.C.2, II.C.3.
213. See, e.g., Czarnezki, supra note 145; Lindstrom, supra note 180; McGarity, supra note
81; Donald N. Zillman & Peggy Gentles, Perspectives on NEPA in the Courts, 20 ENVTL. L. 505
(1990).
214. See Ann Clarke, Seeing Clearly: Making Decisions Under Conditions of Scientific Controver-
sy and Incomplete and Uncertain Scientific Information, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 571, 587 (2006)
("The relationship of changes in human activities to changing Earth conditions and vice
versa raises some of the most challenging questions in science.").
215. See Clarke, supra note 214, at 573. In comparison, the Endangered Species Act in-
structs the Secretary of the Interior to base his determinations on the "best scientific and
commercial data available to him .. . ." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (1) (A) (2006).
216. See Clarke, supra note 214, at 587; see also Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey,
938 F.2d 190, 200-01 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("In examining the impacts of noise on the environ-
ment, the FAA relies on wisdom and experience peculiar to the agency and alien to the
judges on this court."). Justice Stevens once said "When I am so confused, I go with the
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integrity cannot be fully remedied by reforms that aim to incorpo-
rate extra-record evidence and principles from Daubert review2
into judicial proceedings.1 Proposals to increase the use of special
masters in environmental litigation at the trial level can increase
220
the technical competency of a trial court's fact-finding function,
but may interfere too much with the "appropriate exercise of judi-
cial function."
Likewise, jurisdictional and administrative concerns put an end
to early discussions of a special environmental court, staffed with
an expert judiciary. In response to growing concern over the
"complexity of factual determinations" in environmental legisla-
tion, Congress included in the Clean Water Act of 1972 a directive
to the President to make a "full and complete investigation and
study of the feasibility of establishing a separate court system, hav-
ing jurisdiction over environmental matters."222  The Attorney
General report that followed investigated the feasibility of three
possible systems.2 In addition to criticizing the monetary and ad-
ministrative costs of the new court system, the proposal failed to
adequately address jurisdictional concerns, including definitional
and over-breadth problems.224 Other scholars question the wisdom
of specialized courts in general because of concerns over judicial
bias in these settings.
agency." ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAw, SCIENCE, AND
POLICY 178 (6th ed. 2009).
217. See French, supra note 174, at 931-33.
218. SeeDaubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) ("[T]he Rules of
Evidence-especially Rule 702-do assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an
expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.
Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles will satisfy those demands.").
219. See Clarke, supra note 214, at 584-86.
220. See Comment, The Environmental Court Proposal: Requiem, Analysis and Counterpro-
posal, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 676, 692-96 (1974-1975) [hereinafter Environmental Court Proposal].
221. Margaret G. Farrell, Coping with Scientific Evidence: The Use of Special Masters, 43
EMORY L.J. 927, 930 (1994) (explaining that use of special masters appointed under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b) is a "necessary and appropriate departure" from traditional
civil justice system; it is necessary to deal with scientific issues and fact, but raises problems
and potential for abuse); Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judi-
ciary or Reshaping Adjudication, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 394, 394 (1986).
222. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 518, 86 Stat. 816, 899
(1972); see also Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1118 & n.33 (1989-1990); Scott C. Whitney, The Case for Creating a
Special Environmental Court System, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473 (1973).
223. These systems included an environmental court with exclusive original and appel-
late jurisdiction; a court to review all federal agency orders affecting the environment; and a
court to review all orders of designated federal agencies. Environmental Court Proposal, supra
note 220, at 676 & nn.5-7.
224. Id. at 685-86.
225. Randall R. Rader, Specialized Courts: The Legislative Response, 40 AM. U. L. REV 1003,
1004-06 (1990-1991); Revesz, supra note 222, at 1147-53.
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Executive measures. Recent scholarship has focused on the role of
CEQ and the Executive Office, urging them to strengthen NEPA
implementation through executive order or formal rulemaking
procedures.' Though CEQ can put forth language requiring that
an agency's EIS include considerations of "atmospheric and cli-
mactic disturbances," this may not be sufficient to prevent absurd
results from either extraterritorial limits on agency review or an
agency's insincere choice of available science. Regulatory reforms
intending to strengthen the substantive aspect of NEPA2 7 may do
nothing more than perpetuate an agency's "check-the-box" proce-
dural approach to its NEPA obligations without furthering its
substantive goals or expressive value.
Further legislation. Lastly, legislation that addresses NEPA's sub-
stantive weakness by creating a judicially enforceable right to a
healthful environment is politically implausible, while inserting a
standard of review that exceeds the oft-criticized APA "arbitrary
and capricious" standard raises issues of judicial competency. Even
given the benefit of a less deferential standard of review (such as
clear error or de novo review), judges on courts of general jurisdic-
tion that view science as alien are not in a position to consider
their understanding of scientific matter against that of the "expert"
agency, nor are they in a position to weigh on the legitimacy of an
agency's policy decisions. Though stricter standards might express
a more serious approach to agency analysis, it is likely that the ac-
tual agency approach will remain unchanged.
External agency review aims to solve the same ills as the judi-
cial, executive, and legislative reforms discussed above. All of
226. See, e.g., HENRY M. JACKSON FOUND., supra note 32, at 1. The foundation, named
for one of the Senators who established the CEQ, recommends
[a]n Executive Order (1) directing all federal agencies to identify, within 90 days,
programs and activities that, as currently administered, contribute to climate change,
and to identify alternatives that would reduce these impacts and promote better envi-
ronmental stewardship, and (2) directing all federal agencies to assess the extent and
manner in which climate change may affect their missions and the resources they
manage, and to develop plans and strategies within one year for avoiding, adapting to
or minimizing such impacts to the fullest extent possible.
Id. at 3.
227. See, e.g., ENVTL. LAw INST., REDISCOVERING THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLI-
CY ACT: BACK TO THE FUTURE 31-32 (1995). The ELI recommends an executive order
"requir[ing] agency adherence to the six NEPA objectives in decisionmaking," id., and CEQ
regulations requiring agencies to implement those objectives as a "checklist of [environmen-
tal] objectives," id. at 33-34. See also EPAJOURNAL, supra note 153 (suggesting that "change
can occur through a commitment by the federal agencies charged with implementing
[NEPA] through the opportunities provided in changes brought about by the new Council
on Environmental Quality regulation.... rather than a change in the statute itself").
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these reforms, to some degree, recognize that agencies are apt to
engage in biased or scientifically questionable reviews of their
own environmental impacts. The current administrative and legal
framework provides little oversight to correct these problems.
Like other reforms, external agency review strengthens the asser-
tion of NEPA's mandate that "the policies, regulations, and public
laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in
accordance"2 2 with the national environmental policy but does so
while acknowledging the limits on both the judiciary's and the
agencies' ability to enforce it.
C. Existing External Review Under NEPA
Section 309 of the Clean Air Act provides a mechanism for exter-
nal review of agency EIS.20" The provision directs the EPA to review
and provide written comments on major federal actions that require
NEPA analysis230 and to refer the matter to CEQ if the EPA finds the
action is "unsatisfactory from the standpoint of public health or wel-
fare or environmental quality. . .. "' Though this section was
incorporated as a means to enforce agency implementation of
NEPA,"3 the oversight provided by CEQ and EPA is limited: the stat-
utory language grants EPA only the authority to review another
agency's project. That leading agency is then free to carry on with
the proposed project over EPA's express disapproval. When chal-
lenged, the EPA recommendation does not alter the existing
standard of review. Courts will still review the agency's action under
the deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Applied this
way, the court has allowed a project to stand, over the environmen-
tal experts' objections.
228. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006).
229. Id. § 7609. The CEQ then outlines a procedure for referrals and response. 40
C.F.R. § 1504.3 (2006). This is the "Agency as Lobbyist" discussed in Eric Biber, supra note
188, at 42-45.
230. 42 U.S.C. § 7609(a).
231. Id. § 7609(b).
232. See William L. Andreen, In Pursuit of NEPA's Promise: The Role ofExecutive Oversight in
the Implementation of Environmental Policy, 64 Ind. L.J. 205, 223 (1989) (arguing that section
309 was enacted as part of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 "[o]ut of sheer exaspera-
tion" of agencies being either unable or unwilling to fully embrace the new procedural and
substantive demands made by NEPA).
233. See Davis, supra note 173, at 62 & nn.196-98 (citing a case where EPA expressly
stated "we recommend you deny the permit" and the permit, approved over EPA's objec-
tions, withstood judicial review).
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It may be possible to strengthen the role of executive branch
oversight in the NEPA process.2 " Though more extensive EPA in-
volvement would provide a greater check on a leading agency's
environmental assessment and NEPA review,m there are downsides
to this approach. First, the EPA is already stretched too thin and un-
able to perform many of its statutorily mandated tasks, obligations,
and responsibilities. 2 ' Second, the EPA, in its role as policy-maker
and regulator, may not be sufficiently insulated from politics and
other outside influences to fully represent the interests of "uninter-
ested" science.3 The proposed Office of Environmental Analysis
recognizes these limits and counteracts them with a narrow scope
and little political influence.
D. Advantages of an Office of Environmental Analysis
This Note supplies an alternative proposal-a nonpartisan agen-
cy that monitors the integrity of federal agencies' NEPA review.
This agency will have the authority to review both accurately and
objectively an agency's choice of scientific baseline, methodology,
and models; it can also determine how "honestly" an agency incor-
porates scientific analyses and applies the six considerations of
NEPA's opening section to reach its final decision. This proposal
combines the strengths of earlier proposals-the expertise envi-
sioned by CEQ and EPA oversight and the objectivity and
uniformity sought through an expert court system-without their
attendant jurisdictional and administrative problems and implica-
tions of political bias. If successfully established, the Office can
"police" agencies as necessary to ensure that an environmental eth-
ic-the expressive purpose of NEPA-is actually incorporated into
agency decision-making.
234. See generally Davis, supra note 173; Andreen, supra note 232.
235. Such a check would be given effect by EPA's role as an "expert" agency as an inde-
pendent, objective, science-minded reviewer.
236. See supra note 54. The small number of referrals made by EPA to CEQ (only fourteen
between 1974 and 1985) may be reflective of this. See Andreen, supra note 232 at 238-39 &
nn.241-43.
237. See E. Donald Elliott, Science in the Regulatory Process: Strengthening Science's Voice at
EPA, 66 Law & Contemp. Prob. 45, 49-50 & nn.20-25 (2003) ("[T~he causes of the lamen-
table position of science at EPA lie deeper in EPA's organization, structure, and traditions
than the incentives created by judicial review.").
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1. The Office
The Office of Environmental Analysis should be structured to
preserve two important elements of NEPA: (1) active public partic-
ipation in agency review through the public comment process and
disclosure of environmental impacts, and (2) establishing an ongo-
ing agency responsibility to perpetuate NEPA's environmental
policy. The Office could take the form of an independent regulatory
or Congressional agency. While the Office's specific form is beyond
the scope of this Note, whatever form it does take will need to insu-
late it from influence, from both political actors and the agencies it
is responsible for reviewing. To preserve the Office's legitimacy while
insulating it from these influences, it will not be tasked with rule-
making obligations. To maintain the integrity of its work, it will
perform a limited role: review of agencies' environmental analyses
(EIS, EA, and FONSI). The Office of Environmental Analysis will
not evaluate the policy considerations underlying an agency's analy-
sis; rather, it will ensure that the science in the analysis has not been
skewed by those underlying objectives.
2. The Process
To preserve the public participation element of the NEPA pro-
cess, review by the Office of Environmental Analysis should take
place after the initial comment period for a draft EIS, but before
its final promulgation. The Office will thus be in a position to con-
sider public input as part of its ultimate review and account for the
fact that even the "expert" agency might not be aware of the full
breadth of scientific knowledge applicable to the environmental
analysis. The Office's review process may be time consuming, but
will be greatly facilitated when an agency puts forth a clear, con-
cise, and scientifically defensible work product for review.
In fact, aspects of the Office's process might actually speed
NEPA review. By putting the burden of fast and favorable review on
the agency crafting the EIS, the Office's presence will create posi-
tive incentives for agencies to incorporate both NEPA's policies and
procedures into their proposed major actions.2 8 The public will
238. Agencies can be further incentivized to craft NEPA-worthy analyses by dividing re-
view within the Office to various agencies (meaning the same team reads the EIS of the
same agencies each time). With this structure in place, delays caused by the review process
will be the fault of that agency alone, and not of other delinquent agencies clogging up the
pipeline. This can also increase the efficiency of the reviewer's task, since an agency's similar
projects are likely to embrace similar environmental issues.
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indirectly benefit from the agency's incentive to draft an EIS de-
signed for quick and thorough review. A clearly written, concisely
drafted, and well-supported EIS allows the public a greater oppor-
tunity to review, understand, and comment than one in which
scientific analysis is kept only at the level necessary to withstand
"hard look" review.
To further reduce delays, the Office of Environmental Analysis
can incorporate a streamlined review procedure for analyses that
rely on more "straightforward" science collected by the agency it-
self-site survey data, for example--or limit the types of analyses
subject to review to those that include direct or cumulative im-
pacts, or incorporate the use of models."'
Lastly, time lost in the Office review process can be regained
when parties are disputing the validity of an EIS. By offering objec-
tive scientific analysis, the Office can provide recommendations for
the agency to strengthen its own analysis and make its EIS more
litigation-proof. In the alternative, review that is and remains unfa-
vorable to the agency's analysis provides parties and courts of
general jurisdiction a clear basis on which to challenge the agen-
cy's "hard look."
3. Judicial Review
The creation of the Office of Environmental Analysis will leave
judicial review of NEPA lawsuits unchanged, but with one signifi-
cant difference: in matters of methodology or scientific analysis,
the court must defer, not to the "expert" leading agency, but to the
conclusions of the expert and unbiased Office of Environmental
Analysis. Conceptually, the Office can function as an institutional-
ized Special Master, providing the desirable expertise function
without altering the structure of the judicial proceeding."
The impact of this environmental review can be significant. A
study on Special Master proceedings found that the majority of
courts adopted the Special Masters' findings of fact without modi-
fication2 1' and that the Special Masters' activities appeared to
239. The "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review can protect against agency ef-
forts to bypass Office review by neglecting to consider these impacts or incorporate relevant
models.
240. See Brazil, supra note 221, at 417-23; Farrell, supra note 221, at 967-85.
241. Thomas E. Willging et al., Federal Judicial Center, Special Masters' Incidence and
Activity: Report to the Judicial Conference's Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules and Its Sub-
comm. on Special Masters, Federal Judicial Center 56 tbl.13 (2000), available at
http://www.fc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/SpecMast.pdf/$file/SpecMast.pdf.
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influence the outcome of the case. 2 Likewise, reports prepared by
the Office of Environmental Analysis can be used to enforce a
judge's assertion that the agency action is, as in Conservation North-
west v. Rey, incorrect, or to make courts aware of deficiencies that
would otherwise be beyond the limits of judicial competency to
identify.
The courts and the Office of Environmental Analysis must still
leave the policy choices to the leading agency. The mere presence
of the Office will not create substantive mandates in a statute
where such provisions are otherwise lacking. Nor will the Office's
judgment necessarily override the expert agency's conclusions.
However, the Office's analysis will provide parties with a sound ba-
sis to ensure that the EIS promotes NEPA's expressive
environmental policy while furthering understandings of how
agencies are shaped by the need for environmental conservation.
No matter what the agency's underlying policy, the agency's con-
clusions must be justified by the science endorsed by the Office of
Environmental Analysis.
IV. CONCLUSION
No reform will "solve" the problem of climate change or guaran-
tee that a federal agency will choose the environmentally
preferable option in light of its other necessary considerations. De-
spite this, it is important to strengthen NEPA with regards to its
expressive purpose: to ensure that environmental values (and
awareness of climate change impacts) are incorporated into agency
actions and reflected in an objective EIS. The proposed Office of
Environmental Analysis seeks to return integrity to the NEPA pro-
cess, mitigate the problem of agency bias, and bring an expert level
of review to analysis of proposed agency actions.
242. Id. at 57 tbl.14.
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